

# **Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations**

**A Monograph  
by  
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**AY 04-05**

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> 052605	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Monograph	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> MAJ Brandon Newton				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b> A	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)</b> <p>The purpose of this monograph is to study punitive attack and assess what makes these operations successful or unsuccessful. By surveying early international law we can see that attacking to avenge a loss or as retribution is an enduring and justified cause of war. The historical campaigns of both the British and the United States provide some excellent examples of punitive operations in execution. The twenty year fight by the British army against the Mad Mullah in Somaliland, and the United States Army's Punitive Expedition into northern Mexico in search of the bandit Poncho Villa, as well The United States 1986 air raid on the country of Libya are examples of punitive operations. Responses against nations or actors that are punitive must be timely and warranted. Any action that seeks retribution or deterrence must have a limited and attainable objective. One important facet of punitive operations is in their residual deterrence value. Deterrence is the perception of the potential for the use of force. Potential force may be effective against sophisticated and organized polities; however, for primitive loosely organized enemies, the actual use of physical force may be the sole method for achieving a level of deterrence.</p>				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Punitive Expedition, Retribution, Lieber's Code, Law of War, British Somaliland, Punitive Expedition, Libya, El Dorado Canyon			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 61	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> U	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> U	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> U	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> none	

# SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

## MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations

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## Abstract

### Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations

by MAJ Brandon D. Newton, USA, 64 pages.

Using military force against an enemy to punish, avenge a wrong, as retribution is a timeless cause of armed conflict. There are many examples throughout history of successful punitive operations. Analyzing historical punitive expeditions for the elements that made them successful or unsuccessful can aid future military and government leaders in framing strategic and operational conflicts, and serve as a backplane for attempting to understand the nature of punitive expeditions and strikes.

The purpose of this monograph is to study punitive attack and assess what makes these operations successful or unsuccessful. To do this, we first analyze what punitive operations are, and their place in the causes and reasoning for war. By surveying early international law we can see that attacking to avenge a loss or as retribution is an enduring and justified cause of war. Revenge is a uniquely human emotion, and one that is present even in primitive societies who did not wage war against another tribes.

In the United States, one of the earliest scholars who wrote about the laws of war and how they affect punitive doctrine was Francis Lieber. Lieber's Code gives us the idea of military necessity, an important element of punitive operations or actions. Some of the modern concepts of punitive war are found in the early writings on small wars in both the British Army and the United States Army and Marine Corps. In manuals, professional journals, and school instruction one can find the vestiges of a doctrine for punitive operations and expeditions.

The historical campaigns of both the British and the United States provide some excellent examples of punitive operations in execution. The twenty year fight by the British army against the Mad Mullah in Somaliland ended with the use of the airplane to finally quell the Mullah's influence. The United States Army under the command of General John Pershing launched a punitive expedition into northern Mexico in search of the bandit Poncho Villa. A large United States Force pursued Villa, responsible for a cross-border raid into New Mexico, for nearly a year. Pershing never captured Villa, but fought and killed a number of his bandits. A modern example of a punitive strike was The United States 1986 air raid on the country of Libya. This series of air strikes by the United States Navy and Air Force were in response to Libya's support of international terrorist activities against the United States and its western allies.

Drawing on a combination of human behavior, just war concepts, and historical examples allow one to define some elements that may be a useful framework for punitive strikes. Human emotion, revenge, and vengeance are all uniquely human characteristics and will have an enduring impact on conflicts of the future. Responses against nations or actors that are punitive must be timely and warranted. The length of time it takes to respond can and will contribute to effectiveness. Any action that seeks retribution or deterrence must have a limited and attainable objective. Overwhelming force or some asymmetrical advantage is key here as well, as a failed punitive strike becomes something else altogether. Measures of effectiveness for a punitive operation are difficult to determine, and can be a function of one's own behavior as much as an adversary's. One important facet of punitive operations is in their residual deterrence value. Deterrence is the perception of the potential for the use of force. Potential force may be effective against sophisticated and organized polities; however, for primitive loosely organized enemies, the actual use of physical force may be the sole method for achieving a level of deterrence.

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## Introduction: To Punish Using Force

On December 7, 1941 after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the nation quickly prepared to wage total war upon Japan. Although the causes of our entry into World War II are many, there can be no doubt that the feeling of outrage, of the need for vengeance against the Japanese was one of the most compelling and immediate causes for war. The war against the Japanese was characterized by ruthlessness and brutality, culminating in the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japanese population centers. Our apathy, our collective lack of compassion for the plight of the Japanese people was certainly shaped by the fact that they launched an unprovoked attack on us, *and they deserved to be punished for that attack.*

Are military responses that punish other nations or actors effective? Is vengeance a realistic objective for military force? Our current situation with regard to the war on terrorist organizations and the states that support terrorism demands some thoughtfulness about this question. Can punishment or reprisal act as an effective deterrent to future acts? Is it important or even realistic to kill or capture Osama bin Laden? Regardless of the rhetoric that discounts the need to find and kill the believed mastermind of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there can be no doubt that it would be important to the people of this country. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is in at least some part a punitive action, and an examination of punitive doctrine may prove helpful in fighting this new war.

The history of conflict, especially of limited or “small wars” is replete with examples that may prove helpful. Nations have been engaged in small wars to quell insurgencies, perform constabulary duties, as well as punish other states or actors. It is war that punishes by means of attack that is of interest for this monograph. The fundamental nature of the punitive attack is to seek to avenge a wrong. The cause may be reprisal or vengeance, the target may be a state or non-state actor, but the primary aim is to punish, kill, or destroy the enemy as retribution. Punitive actions by nation states have been an essential tool throughout history to inflict will, punishment, and strike back. It is important to look historically at attack for revenge or retribution and the success or failure of such attacks.

In his book *The Savage Wars of Peace*, Max Boot attempts to discuss the efficacy of punitive strikes. Boot asks the question of whether or not the punitive expeditions he describes in his book were successful. Did the punitive actions covered in *Savage Wars* achieve success? Boot answers his own question by stating that “such speculation [on success] is beside the point. Even if their ultimate consequences are unclear, punitive raids serve an important function.” Just what is that function? The function of punitive strikes, according to Boot, is to “satisfy the human impulse to see wrongdoers punished.”<sup>1</sup> Although Boot poses the right question about the success of punitive strikes, as well as providing what I believe is the right answer—he does not offer an analysis of why that is the right answer, or what strategic elements, if any, must be considered for mounting a punitive strike.

Although punitive attacks for revenge, retribution or punishment rarely achieve a concrete military or political aim, punitive strikes or expeditions often result in the achievement of a strategic and political objective that is incalculable—the *public satisfaction in avenging a wrong*. To effectively fight the war on terror, planners must understand that punitive measures may achieve a political aim through force that may be vaporous and intangible. The success or failure of the punishment is more of a function our own perception of the achievement of vengeance, rather than the ubiquitous quantifiable “measures of effectiveness”. What is key here is an uncomfortable distinction between strategy that is contingent upon clear political aims, and strategy that translates unclear political aims into what are essentially immeasurable effects. To further expand on this thought, we must not only examine the desired effect on the enemy but also the effect on our own populations desire for or understanding of revenge.

In addition to revenge satisfaction, punitive strikes serve as an important tool to persuade recalcitrant nations or non-nation entities to act (or not act) a certain way. Edward Luttwak, author of *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* describes this idea of persuasion by force and its effective use by the Empire against client entities or people. He explains that ruled peoples or client leaders did not have to actually *see* the Roman Legions to know that the potential existed for their use. While this

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<sup>1</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 344.

type of dissuasion worked well with more modern, educated clients, it would not work against more primitive, less organized enemies. These groups needed to see the results of actual force to be persuaded, *potential* attack not being a convincing deterrent.<sup>2</sup> Punitive strikes or expeditions against non-organized, non-state actors may be necessary to force these groups into compliance or action. Because we currently face non-organized enemies or threats, the effectiveness of punitive strikes in forcing conformity or acquiescence is another worthy area of investigation.

The natural starting point in analyzing effectiveness of punitive force is to first define punitive attack, what it is and what it is not. Our task will be to understand how a punitive strike fits in the context of the laws of war, and its place in *jus ad bellum*.<sup>3</sup> In doing this analysis, we will first answer a basic question about punitive strikes and their place in the causes of war. Has revenge or retribution historically been a just cause of war? If so, is it still? Secondly, we will look at past doctrine that dealt with punitive expeditions and assess its applicability in defining some of the elements for punitive attack in the United States and Britain. Is there such a thing as a punitive doctrine? The third element continues to examine history by looking at historical punitive expeditions in the last century including British Somaliland, The U.S. Punitive Expedition to Mexico, and finally Libya in 1986. By analyzing historical punitive campaigns, we can attempt to gain some sense of why nations undertook a punitive response, and what happened as a result. We will also analyze whether these expeditions were successful. We start with the British Army actions in Somalia in pursuit of the “Mahdi” army of Muhammad bin Abdullah Hassan, or the “Mad Mullah”. One of many punitive expeditions of the British in Africa, this campaign lasted from 1903-1920 and resulted in one of the first uses of airpower in a punitive expedition. The British Army of Queen Victoria waged war in Africa that was full of punitive actions, and although only the specific attacks into Somaliland will be covered, there are many aspects of punitive doctrine that were present in the operations of the Victorian Army. The second historical campaign is the U.S. Army’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico,

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<sup>2</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976) 32-33.

<sup>3</sup> *Jus ad Bellum*: the justification for war.



1916-1917, to kill or capture Pancho Villa. Conducted by General John J. Pershing, President Wilson ordered the expedition as a response to Villa's attack upon the town of Columbus, New Mexico in 1916, one of the first "terrorist" attacks on American soil. The last historical campaign is the United States strikes on Libya in 1986, operation El Dorado Canyon. This operation was launched in retaliation for Libya's support of terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies.

## Chapter 1: Revenge and the Causes and Justifications for War

Before we begin the discussion of punitive doctrine, it is important to understand what we mean by punitive attack or strike, what the distinction is and where the theoretical and historical basis for using force to punish originates. The word punitive defined means “inflicting, involving, or aiming at punishment”<sup>4</sup>. A punitive attack or expedition is an offensive action with the aim of inflicting punishment, seeking revenge, or exacting retribution from an adversary. The origin of the word is from the Roman *punir*, or “to punish”. Contrary to the words’ Roman roots, revenge, as a cause for conflict is a largely human behavior that predates even Roman times. The Old Testament, specifically Deuteronomy Chapter Two, is often cited as the biblical justification for revenge.

Using force for revenge has transcended all forms of warfare between humans. Attacking for revenge exists in most basic domain of war, the primitive war domain. Although a discussion of primitive and modern war is not within the scope of this monograph, punitive action and its roots in primitive war are an important aspect for understanding the nature of punitive attack. Men have sought revenge through force for thousands of years, and have not eliminated vengeance as a cause of war regardless of how modernity has shaped human conflict over the last two millennia.

In his essay on the functions and causes of primitive war, Andrew Vayda provides two basic hypotheses concerning the causes of primitive war. The first being the constant redistribution of economic variables within the society and the second being the need to deter enemies from repeating prior offenses or insults.<sup>5</sup> The latter hypothesis posits that primitive societies used force to keep an enemy from repeating a past behavior, whether that behavior was an “insult, theft, non-payment of bride price, abduction, rape, trespass, wounding, killing.”<sup>6</sup> Essentially primitive war used force as a response, and by way of this achieved revenge and deterrence. Revenge could motivate the primitive warrior, but there was also a level of deterrence brought about by the punitive attack.

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<sup>4</sup> *The New Merriam Webster Dictionary*, (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2004) 585.

<sup>5</sup> Andrew Vayda, “Human Aggression” in *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, ed. Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, Robert Murphy, (New York: The Natural History Press, 1967) 86-87.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

The desire for retribution among humans is a basic need that transcends almost all other causes of war. Primitive societies that were traditionally not war-like culturally made an exception for fighting to avenge an insult. Alexander Lesser in *War and the State* summarizes this aspect of warfare, pointing to the many primitive societies where war did not exist- the Mission Indians, the Eskimos, the Adaman Islanders, the Western Shoshoni and more<sup>7</sup> who shunned warfare between their peoples. The one reason that they *could* engage in warfare was to seek vengeance for a wrong. The motivation of primitive man to fight another man was deeply personal. This motivation, whether it is for revenge, feud, or deterrence, transcends the move of modern war towards the more clinical causes of national interest or territorial conquest.<sup>8</sup> Revenge is a part of human nature, and because of this, modern societies will fare no better at ridding themselves of punitive attack than the most peaceful of primitive societies could.

Moving from primitive war into the domains of traditional just war theory and modern war, we can find no reduction in the thought that attacking an enemy for revenge is a just cause for war. In fact, punitive attack and vengeance seems to be a thread that runs throughout all of the theories on the causes and reasons for war. No matter how societies have attempted to change the behaviors of nations regarding what is a just or unjust war, war for revenge has tended to endure. In examining the rough divisions of just war historical traditions, one can locate the punitive attack as far back as the classical period of Greece and Rome. As early as 413 B.C the Spartan general Gylippus extorts his Syracusans to “engage in anger, convinced that nothing is more legitimate between adversaries than to claim to satisfy the whole wrath of one’s soul in punishing the aggressor”<sup>9</sup> as motivation for the impending battle against the Athenians. In another example, the Roman statesman Cicero in *De Res Publica* listed “redressing an injury” as one of the two permissible causes of war.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Alexander Lesser, “Response to Vayda Article” in *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, ed. Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, Robert Murphy, (New York: The Natural History Press, 1967) 94.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, 95.

<sup>9</sup> Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. Robert B. Strassler, ed., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998) Gylippus’ speech to the Syracusans, 467.

<sup>10</sup> Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, *International Law and the use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm*, (New York: Routledge, 1993) 13

Revenge as a motive for attack continued from the classical period into the Christian period of theorists and writers. It is during this time we begin to see a Judeo-Christian thread that justified revenge and retribution, regardless of the corresponding efforts of Christianity to constrain the conduct of war.<sup>11</sup> As Christian theocracy and the ideals of pacifism began to hold center stage in the western world, intra-Christian conflict and the ideology of restraint shaped the understanding of punitive attack. However, this restraint was not applied to non-Christian adversaries. In execution, war during the age of chivalry was anything but reserved. Robert Stacy in *The Laws of War* best characterizes the paradox of the savagery of war during this period by explaining that medieval theorists devised the category of *bella romanum* or Roman War, a type of warfare that was characterized by the killing of entire populations or enemies, both combatants and noncombatants.<sup>12</sup> The punitive attack was usually waged within this brutal parameter, most often against non-Christian populations of Pagans, Muslims, or Barbarians.

At the later end of the period, Francisco Victoria (1480-1546) further developed the Christian justification for war espoused by St. Augustine. Victoria empathically accepts the justification of war to avenge a wrong or for retribution. Victoria delineates war for retribution further, by saying that war to punish in and of itself is right, but also that a failure to act in response to a wrong could apply to defensive war “For they [the enemy] would only be emboldened to make a second attack, if the fear of retribution did not keep them from wrongdoing”.<sup>13</sup> Victoria adds the other facet to war as revenge, reminding us of the deterrence factor of a punitive strike on an enemy. Victoria also made a distinction between the justification of the individual in responding to an attack and the legality of the state. His opinion was that the individual was prohibited from vengeance, whereas the state had the right and obligation to avenge wrongs committed against the state or its citizens.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) 2.

<sup>12</sup>Robert C. Stacey, *The Age of Chivalry*, in *The Laws of War; Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Schulman, eds., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 28.

<sup>13</sup>Franciscus de Victoria, “De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones, Relectiones Theologicae XII”, trans. John Pawley Bate, Ernest Nye, ed, In James Brown Scott, *The Classics of International Law*, (New York: Oceana, 1964) 167.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, 168.

Continuing the morality argument for retribution, Balthazar Ayala, c.1548-1584 a Spanish juriscounsel, draws upon much of the same Judeo-Christian material to make his case for war as a means for vengeance. Ayala presents three justifications of war. His first case is war for self-defense, or, war for natural reasons. War to retake something stolen or lost is also a just cause, similar in fashion to recouping losses from theft. The third just cause is war undertaken “to take vengeance for some wrong which has been unjustifiably inflicted.”<sup>15</sup> In justifying punitive attack, Ayala relies once again on the specific passages of the Bible that have been interpreted as underwriting war for revenge. Ayala cites the ever-familiar Deuteronomy Chapter 2, as well as Samuel Chapter 2. With Ayala, we see once again that attacking your enemy for vengeance or retribution is a thread of *jus ad bellum* that crosses the divisions of time.

The movement of thoughts on the causes of war into the secular period (c1150-1700) and the changes found in thoughts on the causes of war did not include a movement away from war for revenge. Writers and theorists in this phase tended to move religion and morality away from justifications for war, where they began to minimize the role that religion played upon the basis for just war.<sup>16</sup> The movement as the medieval age came to a close was influenced largely by the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Grotius, a Dutch lawyer, poet, and mathematician, wrote *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, a comprehensive treatise on war that shaped international law for much of modern times. In light of the move to supplant religion and superstition as the basis for war, Grotius still advocated war for vengeance. Grotius states that wars are assigned to “three justifiable causes, defence,[sic] recovery of property, and punishment.”<sup>17</sup> It is interesting that he does not cite the familiar biblical references that we seen so often in his justification for war as punishment, instead relying on Roman and Greek examples. Grotius seems to take a legal position in directing revenge, as if the thresholds and standards for retribution are akin to those one would find in a court of law. Grotius cites Plato’s ninth

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<sup>15</sup> Balthazar Ayala, *Three Books on the Laws of War and the Duties Connected with War and on Military Discipline*, trans. John Pawley Bate, in *The Classics of International Law*, (New York, Oceana, 1964) 11.

<sup>16</sup> Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, *International Law and the use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm*, (New York: Routledge, 1993) 15.

book of Laws in his discussion of the justification for reparations. Grotius also attempts to further define wars to avenge as St. Augustine meant it. He states that St. Augustine used the word avenge broadly, Grotius interpreting it as “exact requital for”<sup>17</sup>. For all the advancements attributed to Grotius with regard to international law there seems to be little to no difference in his thoughts concerning war for punishment and the line of international law thinkers that preceded him.

The thinking and attitudes about the causes of war have been shaped over the last two thousand years by custom, religion, economics, tradition, and science. What is important in analyzing the effectiveness of modern punitive strikes is to understand that the desire for revenge is a human characteristic that has transcended the rise of nation states, the impact of religion, and the custom and traditions of a variance of cultures in the western world. Vengeance shaped warfare in primitive societies, even in those that abhorred war for all other reasons. Although the move toward modern war meant that the motives for aggression would most often be territory, self-defense, and a competition for resources, attacks for revenge, retribution or punishment would continue. This idea should not be lost on those who would say that war for vengeance is absent in modern history.

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<sup>17</sup>Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, et al. reprint ed. James Brown Scott, *Classics of International Law*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1964) 171.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 172.

## Chapter 2: Early United States and British Punitive Doctrine

To better understand the efficacy of punitive attack and determine some of the elements of this type of warfare, it is important to analyze how punitive doctrine evolved in the United States and Great Britain. When we look at punitive expeditions and attacks during this time, we see that using punitive measures against an enemy was carried out largely in the domain of the “small wars” of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Did a doctrine of punitive strike develop in the United States Military? Did such a doctrine emerge in the British Army? Can we find examples of the idea of force as punishment through the doctrinal tenets espoused within either force? To answer these questions we will analyze three important areas that may provide some insight. The first is to analyze the early shaping of war for revenge in the United States Military by looking at how the ideas of two men came together through the circumstance of the American Civil War. Those two men were Major General Henry Halleck, President Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War General-in-Chief and Dr. Francis Lieber, author of General Order number 100. Next, we look at Great Britain’s contribution to small war doctrine and punitive measures by surveying the work of Colonel Charles E. Callwell and his influential manual *Small Wars*, published in 1896. Finally, we will turn our attention back to the United States and determine what punitive doctrine emerged in the United States in the early nineteenth century up to the publication of the United States Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* in 1940. The purpose here is to look at the recent history of punitive attack and begin to identify some of the strategic elements of punishment through force that were present in the military traditions of the two nations.

To take up an azimuth, a starting point for just how the views of punishment and force were shaped in the United States, it is appropriate to look briefly at the contributions of Dr. Francis Lieber. Labeled as one of the fathers of the modern law of war, Francis Lieber wrote a code for the conduct of war that would shape the law of land warfare into the twentieth century. As with most historical significant occurrences, Dr. Lieber happened to be present at such a time when his personal intellectual capacity, the political climate, and the relationship between the Union north and the

Confederate south would all conspire in an example of how the theoretical writings were translated into reality.

Francis Lieber was born in Berlin in on the March 18, 1800, to a working family of modest means.<sup>19</sup> His life is unique in that he lived through and experienced many of the most tumultuous times in Europe and the United States. His experiences throughout his life certainly contributed to his writings and thoughts about war. At the age of fifteen Lieber fought the French at Waterloo under Blücher. Lieber was wounded at the battle of Namur, and then continued a life that was marked by change and circumstance. He was imprisoned with his brother for four months in Prussia as an enemy of the state. After his release, he earned a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1820 from the University of Jena, and then went and fought in the Greek War for Independence. He left Greece and took up service as a tutor to the Prussian ambassador Niebuhr. After travel to England, the twenty-seven year old Lieber decided that his fortunes must lie in America.

Lieber arrived in Boston in 1827 and began a career of teaching and writing. He was hired as the head of the Boston Gymnasium, made editor of the *Encyclopaedia Americana*, and then in 1835 was given the position of the Chair of History and Political Economy at South Carolina College. He taught for twenty-two years in South Carolina, and in 1857 was made the Professor of Modern History, Political Science and International, Civil and Common Law at Columbia College in New York. Francis Lieber was an interesting and accomplished man, one whose life story is worth investigation by any student of military history. His accomplishments as they relate to punitive doctrine, however, revolve around his work during the Civil War in writing General Order 100—the Lieber Code. Lieber's Code, its interpretation and usage by President Lincoln, Sherman and history ever after would add an important principle of response and punishment with force; the principle of *military necessity*.

The story of how Lieber came to write General Order No. 100, also called Lieber's Code, is interesting in and of itself. The Code, titled *General Orders, no. 100: Instructions for the Government*



*of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, was comprised of ten sections of 157 articles.<sup>20</sup> It covered many of the legal and practical aspects of warfare, and addressed the problems at a time when the Union army needed a framework for addressing many of the problems of warfare that they had not anticipated or encountered before. In the years since the start of the Civil War, Lieber had developed a informal relationship with the War Department, including Abraham Lincoln's General-in-Chief, General Henry Halleck.

Halleck, an accomplished author on matters of International Law himself (he had published an exhaustive work in 1861 titled *Halleck's International Law*) was petitioned by Lieber in November of 1863 to have the President form a committee to form a set of rules and laws on war that would fill in where the current Articles of War were insufficient. The two exchanged a number of letters with generally the same argument. Halleck, being acutely focused on the war he was fighting, responded "I have no time at the present to consider the subject mentioned in the paper enclosed."<sup>21</sup> Lieber, who had more at stake in the war than academic interest—he had three sons fighting in the war, two Union and one Confederate—continued to press Halleck on the formation of the committee. In one exchange of letters, Lieber prompted Halleck to take his suggestion "out of the pigeon-hole of your mind" and soon after, Lieber received orders appointing him and four military officers to a board that would eventually produce Lieber's Code. Known for its simplicity yet its broad flexibility, the Code would impart *military necessity* as an important element of punitive military action.

Lieber's code established the concept of military necessity as a rule of warfare in the tradition of the lawful conduct of war. Military necessity as defined in article 14 of the code "as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends in war."<sup>22</sup> The duality of the concept is striking. At once it seems to both empower and limit a commanders action. It allows commanders to achieve the ends regardless of the brutality

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<sup>19</sup>Francis Lieber, *The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber*, Thomas Sergeant Perry, ed., (Boston: Osgood, 1882) 2.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Shelly Hartigan, *Lieber's Code and the Law of War* (Chicago: Precedent, 1983), 15.

<sup>21</sup> Hartigan, *Lieber's Code*, 14. In a letter from General Halleck, to Lieber, Nov. 15, 1862, from the Lieber Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

<sup>22</sup> Francis Lieber, *Article 14, General Orders 100*, in Hartigan *Lieber's Code*, 48.

of the means, as well as placing limits upon a commander to ensure his actions are out of sheer necessity. The paradox of military necessity as a restraint versus military necessity as a “license for mischief<sup>23</sup>” is well documented by Burrus Carnahan in his article on Lieber’s Code and military necessity. Carnahan’s thesis on military necessity is that although originally envisioned by Lieber as *restraint* on warfare, it has generally been used through history as a *justification* for outrageous acts of violence and destruction. He argues that nations and individuals engaged in war have used military necessity to underwrite some of the most egregious acts against their fellow man.<sup>24</sup>

Lieber’s thoughts were clear about the effects of retaliation in the Code. He understood the spiraling nature of the cycle of retribution, and the damage this cycle could do to humanity. Lieber makes it clear that any action taken out of a sense of retribution should be also viewed in the effect it will have on the deterrence of future acts. Lieber in articles twenty-seven and twenty-eight:

Article 27. The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch...*A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.*”

Article 28. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure of revenge, *but only as a means of protective retribution...*Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war<sup>25</sup>

It is essential to comprehend the duality of military necessity in punitive actions. Military necessity must operate within the framework of effect, always pinned to the fact that the brutality and strength of the response must walk on a keen edge, balanced between punishment that *deters*, and punishment that *provokes*. On the other hand, necessity in the more brutal sense must be seen by one’s own population as negotiating a balance between satisfying revenge, and invoking outrage or sympathy at brutal tactics

Lieber best describes the basic flaw with military necessity with these words to Halleck, saying “our little pamphlet...short but pregnant and weighty like some stumpy Dutch woman when in the family way with coming twins.” According to Hartigan the “twins” are military *necessity and*

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<sup>23</sup> Burrus M. Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and the Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity”, *The American Journal of International Law* 92, no. 2. (April 1998): 218. attributed to the Confederate Secretary of War, Henry Seddon.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 230.

<sup>25</sup> Hartigan, *Lieber’s Code*, 50.

*retaliation versus humanity and reconciliation.*<sup>26</sup> When you place these twins in the family of the information domain, one gets the added complication of how each actor interprets the punitive action on the continuum of deterrence and retaliation.

The best example of the more severe interpretation of military necessity and punishment occurred shortly after the Code was adopted. Caranahan concludes his essay by stating that military necessity viewed as a *restraint* on war is largely a thing of the past. He posits that the important legacy of Lieber in developing the concept of restraint, and Lincoln's ability to operate within that concept was a "model for military and civilian officials".<sup>27</sup> What Caranahan seems to have forgotten is Sherman's march to the sea in 1864. This was certainly not military necessity that was a combination of "political prudence, moral care, and military realism". Sherman's attack into the heart of the South embodies all in use of force to punish, *indirectly* and with the *effect* of your actions in mind. I am including the below letter written on December 24, 1864 from General Sherman to General Halleck. This excerpt is a stand-alone primer on punitive measures, effect based operations and military necessity.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because *the enemy is disconcerted by them*...I think my campaign of last the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a *direct attack upon Lee's army* as though I were operating within the sound of his artillery.

We are not only *fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people*, and we must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies...I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect.<sup>28</sup>

Francis Lieber's work in shaping a useful set of articles to govern the conduct of war contributed for many years to the policies and tactics of the United States Army. The proof of the enduring qualities of General Order 100 is that it was still informing our policies and strategy well into the twentieth century.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>27</sup> Caranahan, *Lincoln, Lieber, Laws*, 231.

<sup>28</sup> Curt Anders, *Henry Halleck's War: A Fresh Look at Lincoln's Controversial General-in-Chief*, (Indiana: Guild Press of Indiana, 1999) 640-641. Excerpts from a letter from General Sherman to General Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the Union Army, December 1864.

For Great Britain and her Army, punitive expeditions in the nineteenth and the twentieth century were executed in the domain of the small war. The British Army through the Victorian era and into the early twentieth century perfected most of the doctrine and tactics of the punitive expedition through their colonial conquests in the world. This was especially apparent in Africa. One of the most influential writers of military doctrine for the British Army at the turn of the century was Colonel Charles E. Callwell. Colonel Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice*, first published in 1896, provides us two important concepts in forming a punitive doctrine; the limited objective and the balance between long term effect and short-term punishment.

Colonel C.E. Callwell was a British Army Officer who was schooled at Haileybury and commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1878. His service to the Crown included action in the Afghan war in 1880 and the first Boer War in 1881. He began writing *Small Wars* while serving as an intelligence officer in the war department. He published the first edition of *Small Wars* in 1896. Following five years in this staff assignment, he then served in the Turko-Greek War of 1897, and then in Africa in the South African War in 1899. He published the final edition of the book in 1904. He retired in 1909 as a Colonel, but later served in World War I in the War Office where he reached the rank of Major General.

Callwell divides small wars into three types, one of which is the campaign “undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy”<sup>29</sup> thereby generally fitting within his definition of small wars. Another observation, essentially a fact of punitive strikes, is that campaigns “to chastise will generally be on foreign soil”.<sup>30</sup> While this may strike at the obvious, it is important in understanding the two domains of the punitive strike. The effects of the physical action are always separated from the effect exerted on the domestic informational domain.

A second important element that Callwell contributes to punitive doctrine is that element of the limited objective. Punitive strikes exist within the realm of limited war, and thereby must have a

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<sup>29</sup> Major General C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice, 3d ed.* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1906. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) 25.

<sup>30</sup> Callwell, *Small Wars*, 27.

limited objective. The desire to obtain revenge or to punish are intangibles that are tough to justify in the national interest over time. The window of opportunity to achieve the *desired effect on the target of the punishment, as well as upon the vindicated, decreases over time and distance*. One method that the British Army was able to use to minimize some of the effect of waning national interest was to use foreign troops to carry out many of their operations. As Porch says in his introduction to *Small Wars* among the many reasons that imperial warfare was constrained was in part, due to "reluctance of the imperial powers to commit their sons to wars of seemingly marginal national interest, meant that up to a two-thirds of French and British expeditions were composed of troops recruited in the colonies. This allowed the British to sustain operations to pacify and punish colonial enemies while not risking marginalized support from home due to a protracted campaign. Revenge may be a national interest, but it is usually a fickle one.

Colonel Callwell outlines another important aspect of punitive expeditions when he writes about the effect of destroying real property when waging punitive war. The distinction he raises is between desired effects, whether the purpose is for long term effect or short term punishment. Callwell makes a point of differentiating the effectiveness of the destruction of crops, villages, stores of grain, other foodstuffs etc. These targets could prove to be more "exasperating" than livestock, dwellings, or other items that may be rebuilt, saying "wanton damage tends to embitter their feeling of enmity"<sup>31</sup>. Callwell points out that commanders exercise care in selecting targets for destruction, seeking the destruction of limited items that would have a short term effect on the enemy population. Callwell tries to instill that there is a "limit to the amount of destruction which is expedient". He did, however, see a difference in quelling an insurrection, where there was a need to achieve a long-term effect upon the population; here one must punish in the long-term sense.<sup>32</sup>

In the United States, the development of punitive attack doctrine progressed at a much slower pace and with less formality than the British examples. Perhaps many would explain this negligence of "small war" doctrine on a lack of participation in irregular war through the turn of the nineteenth

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 41.

century. This could not be further from the case. Both the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps undertook irregular warfare operations that allowed them the first-hand practical experience in operations to pacify or to punish. This experience should have proven invaluable in crafting enduring doctrine that supported these types of operations.

The United States Army had a great deal of experience in operations to pacify and punish by the start of the First World War, but did not propagate that experience into the formal doctrine of the force. Two of the best writings on the development of Army and Marine Corps small wars doctrine are *Mars Learning* by Keith Bickel and *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* by Andrew Birtle. Both of these books are exhaustive in their analysis of how irregular warfare doctrine developed (or failed to develop) in each of the services. Each offers a few insights into the marginalization of pacification and punitive methods in the body of formal doctrine.

In the years before the Great War, US Army had recent experience in employing the harsh measures needed in punitive attacks or pacification campaigns in the Philippines, Cuba, the China Expedition and others. In the Philippine Campaign the Army had been forced to use harsh tactics, employing “hard and sometimes unsavory measures after more benign measures had failed.”<sup>33</sup> Additionally, the Army officer looked to European examples of how best to deal with recalcitrant populations, examples that relied upon a combination of incentive and force.<sup>34</sup> Because of this, the Army developed a great deal of experience within the ranks, but it was always kept at an informal level. Exchanges between officers and veterans became the base of knowledge in pacification doctrine and techniques. The formal teachings and doctrine of the force focused on winning the large conventional battles that the Army saw as critical.<sup>35</sup> One example of this is of the 850 professional

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>33</sup> Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998) 279.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 277.

<sup>35</sup> Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 29.

journal articles between 1898-1915, only 3 percent dealt with irregular or small wars tactics, of those 29 articles, only 9 dealt with columnar punitive patrolling.<sup>36</sup>

The reasons for this rejection (at least formally) of punitive tactics is inconclusive. Birtle puts forth a thought that the US Army was more apt to accept tactics that were not as harsh as was needed in the proper application of the “carrot and stick” method. He cites that the army *would in fact* resort to harsh punitive measures to quell insurgencies, destroying crops, punishing civilians, etc. but it did so reluctantly because of a real feeling of benevolence, and a pragmatic view of the fleeting support of the American public should to harsh of measures be utilized.<sup>37</sup> That harsh, punitive measures had worked in the past was something that seemed to be forgotten as time passed. This was exacerbated by veterans leaving the service over time, as well as the overall attraction of using more compassionate measures to win over the enemy.<sup>38</sup>

The time between Lieber’s Code of 1863 and the start of World War I was filled with instances where the U.S. Army fought a number of campaigns to pacify and punish an enemy. As time went on and experienced veterans continued to leave the ranks, the tactics of pacification in the Army continued to be marginalized. The 1914 publication of the *Cavalry Service Regulations*, was a pinnacle in irregular warfare doctrine for the US Army. It contained information that had been left out of many publications up to that time, including items not covered in the Infantry Drill regulations. It included a few pages on what it called “minor warfare.”, which advocated the seizure of crops or herds to terminate resistance by an enemy. Other observations were that “fear and hunger are the principle influences to which such enemies are susceptible”.<sup>39</sup> This reference to fear would seem to indicate that officers at least tacitly understood the relationship between force, fear, and deterrence. After 1914, all the references to irregular warfare were removed for future editions.<sup>40</sup> The

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 44.

<sup>37</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 278.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 279.

<sup>39</sup> *Cavalry Service Regulations, United States Army (experimental) 1914*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1914) 280.

<sup>40</sup> Bickel, *Mars Learning*, 50.

responsibility for further development of pacification and punitive doctrine would lie with the United States Marine Corps.

As Marine Corps Small Wars Doctrine developed through the period of 1915 – 1940, it continued to be informed by multiple inputs. The first was Callwell's *Small Wars*, along with the experiences of other European armies. Second was the body of professional writing that was published in journals like the *Marine Corps Journal*. The final source and the most influential was the Marine experiences in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The trend in Marine Corps punitive doctrine was that it developed over time to embrace more benevolent tactics to achieve effects, eschewing forceful tactics of punitive strikes and reprisals.

The carrot and stick approach was used effectively by the Marines in operations in Latin America. However, like the Army, the Marine approach seemed to advocate much more carrot than stick. This may have been because of the lack of manpower the Marines had in fighting their campaigns in Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. As a comparison of Marine and Army forces, the Marines fielded, 1000-2000 marines in Haiti during 7 year period. The U.S. Army in Philippines had 60,000-100,000 men. The coverage difference was 1 marine per 5-10 square miles to the 1 soldier per .5 sq mile on Luzon.<sup>41</sup> Successful punitive operations may have required a size of force that Marines did not have. Carrots may have been the only choice.

Marine tactics for pacification and punishment were not without *some* use of sticks. Officers wrote monographs and articles for publication that advocated some harsh methods of force and punishment. One such monograph was Major Samuel Harrington's *Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars* written in 1921. This was the most thorough treatment of small wars doctrine after the actions in Dominican Republic. It advises the use of force as a paramount tool for the destruction of the enemy's will. He cites the British model of the psychological effects of destruction, using force to make the enemy feel the hopelessness of continued opposition.<sup>42</sup> A second set of articles was published in 1931-1933 by Major Harold Utley in three separate issues of *The Marine Corps Gazette*.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 76.



Borrowing from Callwell, Utley classifies small wars into three types, campaigns for conquest and expedition, suppression of insurrection, and punitive expeditions. In the first section he cites some successful methods for pacification used in the past by other nations:

The killing or wounding or capture of those opposed to us and the destruction of their property.  
The destruction of the property of those who aid and abet those hostile to us.  
The laying waste of entire sections inhabited by people generally supporting those hostile to us.  
The removal and dispersion of all of the inhabitants of an area of unrest.<sup>43</sup>

This is a harsh listing of tactics, and Utley points out that except for the first point, *any* use of the latter three would only incite trouble for the force at home and in the country. Even though he indicates the problem with more callous methods, he goes on to criticize those in the United States government and “so-called Americans, who under one pretext or another will assist in originating and spreading tales of alleged ‘atrocities’ by our troops”.<sup>44</sup>

By the time the Marine Corps formalized small wars doctrine with the publication of *Small Wars Manual* in 1940, it included hardly any reference at all to punitive measures. The Marine Corps had written punitive operations out of the formal doctrine of the Corps. Instead, the manual advocates benevolent methods in almost all cases, underwriting the belief that the only one can only be effective through benevolent means. The overarching strategy for small wars was that “tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.”<sup>45</sup> Unlike other books or articles of the past, the manual places no value in the effective use of force against enemy forces, actors, or populations as punishment or for deterrence.

The only references to punitive operations or reprisals or given to warn against unintended effects, *with no mention* of the possibility of beneficial effects on the enemy or the deterring future behavior. “Drastic punitive measures to induce surrender, or action in the nature of reprisals, *may awaken sympathy with the revolutionists*. Reprisals and punitive measures may result in the

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 136.

<sup>43</sup> Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars.” *Marine Corps Gazette* 16, no. 1 (May 1931): 51.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 51.

destruction of lives and property of *innocent people*; such measures may have an adverse effect upon the discipline of our own troops.”<sup>46</sup> Instead of noting that force may *awaken fear or compliance* among revolutionists, the writers of the manual only note one possible outcome. Carrot and sticks yes, but certainly more carrot than stick.

The tactics and techniques of punitive doctrine existed mostly in the informal domain of the United States Marine Corps and The United States Army. Although there were articles, pamphlets, monographs, etc. that touched on the use of force to deter, punish, or pacify, most of the real experiences in the harsh tactics of small wars were diminished over time. This was caused by time itself, as well as an a general acceptance by both services that the only effective means of obtaining desired effects was through more benevolent means.

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<sup>45</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940) 1-17, 32.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, 1-15, 27.

### Chapter 3: British Army Punitive Operations: Somaliland, 1899-1920

It is difficult to find an Army that has waged more punitive expeditions than the British Victorian Army. From the rise of Queen Victoria in 1837 until well past the end of the First World War, the British Army frequently waged punitive war throughout *Pax Britannia*. There is no conclusive list of all of the minor expeditions and campaigns that the British Army undertook during this period, but it suffice it to say there was not a single year of Queen Victoria's reign that a soldier of the crown was not fighting across the world to suppress rebellions, mutinies, or uprisings.<sup>47</sup> During the period of Colonial campaigning, the British Army was involved in three types of warfare: campaigns of conquest, campaigns to suppress an insurrection, and punitive expeditions. Punitive expeditions or strikes were the tactic of choice to avenge a wrong, wipe out an insult, or kill a threatening enemy.<sup>48</sup> The punitive expedition also allowed the crown to protect the British citizen regardless of how far he ranged from Mother England's shores. This feeling was well illustrated in 1850 by a member of Parliament with these words: "As the Roman in days of old, held himself free from indignity when he could say *civis Romanus sum*, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong".<sup>49</sup> The British Army, through experience and time if nothing else, became well versed at carrying out punitive expeditions.

There are a few aspects that shaped the Victorian Army's actions when it came to punitive attacks. The general doctrine used by the British was, once challenged or disobeyed, the local British authorities had to respond immediately and take the offensive. James in *Savage Wars* considers speed, decisive victory, and a show of force as components of this early British doctrine. It was also necessary to provide a visible signal of victory or conquest. After the defeat of Yonni natives in Sierra Leone in 1887, Colonel Winton told the assembled chiefs "the Queen has shown you her power by

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<sup>47</sup> Byron Farwell, *Queen Victoria's Little Wars*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; W.W. Norton & Co., 1985) 1.

<sup>48</sup> Edward M. Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992) 275.

sending her force and taking her country which now belongs to me and the governor. When the people make war, those who have been conquered have to suffer for their misdeeds.”<sup>50</sup> Winton followed up this speech with some Maxim fire, to impress upon the natives his almost supernatural power.

The British knew that it was important to act swiftly and with overwhelming force in order to punish those who defied the imperial rule of the crown. They waged a kind of imperial warfare that was best described as ruthless, using punitive columns and expeditions, against local rulers who dared defy British authority.<sup>51</sup> Their tactics had not always been dependant upon such brute force. It had developed over time and experience as a matter of necessity and in short, because it was effective. In some of the initial campaigns on the Continent, the British had attempted to rely on the threat of force and the power of the Crown to impress upon the native forces to mend their errant ways. Take for example an early punitive expedition launched against the Ashanti in 1823 by Sir Charles McCarthy, British Governor at Cape Coast Castle. As he drew near the Ashanti warriors, Sir Charles ordered "*God Save the King*" played while he stood at attention in the jungle. He expected that the Ashanti warriors would be impressed by this act, and that they would render the same courtesy to the Crown. Unimpressed, they attacked his column soundly defeating the West Indian Regiment and their Fanti allies. Sir Charles was killed, and his skull removed to Kumasi where it was displayed every year during the annual Yam Festival.<sup>52</sup> As the Victorian army waged punitive war repeatedly throughout the nineteenth century, they learned that decisive and overwhelming force, applied quickly, was a key component of punitive operations.

The stark use of force was not the only facet of the Victorian Army punitive campaigns in Africa. There seemed to always be an undercurrent of perceived ethnic superiority by the British compared to its various foes. Even in the cases where native troops were doing the majority of the fighting, which was often, it was as if somehow the power or aura of the crown invoked a superiority

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<sup>49</sup> Farwell, *Little Wars*, 167.

<sup>50</sup> Lawrence James, *The Savage Wars: British Campaigns in Africa, 1870-1920*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 175.

<sup>51</sup> James, *Savage Wars*, 174.

of race, people, and country. British officers used this to their advantage when attacking to motivate their troopers. During the Ashanti campaign Wolsley told his men “Soldiers and Sailors, remember that the black man holds you in superstitious awe: be cool; fire low, fire slow, and charge home.”<sup>53</sup>

There was a sporting quality to the campaigns, as if the British regiments were on some great safari, determined to bag their intended quarry. In the British Victorian army, the skills of the big game hunter were as desired on the battlefield as tactical acumen. Officers found the skills needed to hunt a tiger, rouge-elephant or other beasts desirable among the men.<sup>54</sup> There was a similar connection between team sports and warfare in the British ranks, as if "war and sport shared a common ground"<sup>55</sup> This idea that campaigns should be waged with some fairness as if they were a game of football may have contributed to the brutality of many of the campaigns, since the “uncivilized” native inhabitants were not often extended the courtesy of “fair-play”. It is interesting that they considered the war with the Boers, another “civilized people” more on par with fair competition between two teams, calling it "the last of the gentleman’s wars".<sup>56</sup>

When viewed in total, the British Victorian Army perfected the tactics of punitive expeditions and pacification through force during the eighteenth century. Their use of force was usually swift forceful, and decisive. However, as the reign of the empire moved closer to the twentieth century other forces began to enter into the equation. A more sympathetic public, the growing costs of policing the empire, and the proliferation of more advanced weapons began to make wars of pacification increasingly difficult. An important observation concerning punitive war was occurring toward the turn of the century. British commanders in the field were obliged to use brutal means that the general public back in Britain abhorred. British commanders had to continually resort to increasingly brutal means of torturing captives, sacking and burning villages, and even in one case offering a bounty for the head of a tribal chief. This was perfectly accepted, and even in many cases

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<sup>52</sup> Farwell, *Little Wars*, 164.

<sup>53</sup> Speirs, *Late Victorian Army*, 299.

<sup>54</sup> James, *Savage Wars* 161.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 159.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 160.

*expected* behavior among many tribes and cultures of Africa, but not among the civilized public back on the home front who considered such behavior barbaric.<sup>57</sup>

The campaigns of the British Army in Somaliland were some of the last punitive operations of the empire on the African continent. Units from the British Army as well as British native units spent twenty years trying to capture or kill the Mad Mullah of Somaliland through a series of campaigns to bring the charismatic religious leader to justice. The British acquired Somalia as a protectorate in 1884 because of its strategic position in western Africa. They administered the protectorate from coastal cities, primarily occupying and operating in the population centers of Berbera. The coastal regions were not difficult for the British to administer. It was the hinterland of Somalia that became the domain of the Mullah.

Sayyid Muhammad Abd Allah Hassan was born in 1856 and died in 1920. He was a Somali religious leader who led his people in a holy war against the British, Italians and their local allies in the region. He was a tall, charismatic man who was impressive in his ability to motivate his followers. He lived in the interior of Somalia in the mullah village of Kobfardod in the Ogaden, where he spent the first thirty-nine years of his life preaching to his followers. The Mullah did the work of any normal Muslim cleric, and he was on good terms with the British authorities, often mediating on their behalf between warring tribesmen.<sup>58</sup> Towards the turn of the century, the Mullah began to preach to his followers that they must follow a more fundamental path of Islam, rejecting British or any other rule but that of Allah. The Mullah began to consolidate power among a larger group of Muslim tribes in the interior regions of the country.

On March 23, 1899, the Mullah asked the British to intervene on his behalf to recover some camels stolen by another tribe. The British, as a *quid pro quo*, wanted him to return a British rifle they believed the mullah had. His heretofore neutral demeanor then turning to anger, he returned the letter to the British, painted red, saying “There is no God but Allah, nought have I stolen from you or any

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 174.

<sup>58</sup> Silberman, 524., Leo Silberman, “The ‘Mad’ Mullah: Hero of Somali Nationalism”. *History Today* 10. (August 1960): 524.

other. Seek what you want from him who robbed you. Serve him whom you have chosen to serve.<sup>59</sup> Colonel Hayes Sadler, the British Consul located in Berber, believed that an expedition should be mounted in order to quickly block any attempt by the Mullah to consolidate the tribes against a single enemy. Sadler knew that the Mullah would be able to motivate large groups of zealous followers by using the power of religion.<sup>60</sup> Sadler was correct in his assessment. Left unchecked by any opposition from the British, the Mullah was able to raise enough followers to attack the “infidels”<sup>61</sup> in Ethiopia, and by 1902 had over 30,000 followers. The British were too late to mount a credible response, but they eventually organized a punitive expedition against the Mad Mullah.

Between 1903 and 1904 the British mounted expeditions against the Mullah, penetrating into the interior of Somalia with large punitive columns. The British tactic was to attempt to draw the Mullah’s forces out into open combat, where they could be decisively engaged. 16,000 troops fought engagements against the Mullah that were unsuccessful. In fact the Mullah was able to overwhelm small formations of isolated British troops in three different battles. In one battle, the Mullah was able to capture two machine guns. Fortunes changed when the Mullah engaged a large British force in Jidbali in January 1904. The Somali fighters were routed when they continued to throw charge after charge into the impenetrable British square, losing over four hundred fighters. The British losses at Jidbali were five killed and nine wounded. The Mullah learned his lesson, and avoided such decisive battles in the future.<sup>62</sup>

In spite of the defeat at Jidbali, the Mullah continued to become more and more powerful, and towards the end of the 1906, the balance of power in the protectorate continued to sway toward the Mullah. The British people became less and less interested in supporting expensive military operations, and the Mullah became increasingly powerful. The Mullah even waged his own information operations campaign on the British public. Targeting a liberal majority in 1906, the Mullah sent a letter to the British people that was widely published in the press.

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<sup>59</sup> Silberman, “The Mad Mullah”, 525.

<sup>60</sup> James, *Savage Wars*, 152.

<sup>61</sup> At the time, Emperor Menelik II, who was Amharic and a Christian, ruled Ethiopia. He advocated secularism and religious freedom in Ethiopia.

“I have no cultivated fields, no silver or gold for you to take. My country is no good to you. If the country was cultivated or contained houses or property, it would be worth your while to fight. The country is all thorn and jungle...If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant-heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war, nothing else. I have met your men in battle and have killed them. We are heartily pleased at this. Our men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We kill and you kill.”<sup>63</sup>

The mounting costs of the military operations in Somalia were a concern to the British Treasury. The grant in 1904 to the protectorate had been just 78,000 pounds but had grown to 190,000 by 1909.

The commissioner in Somalia believed that the strength and organization of the Mullah was waning, and wanted a “special expeditionary force” deployed to take advantage of this condition. The Crown was dismayed by the cost of an offensive against the Mullah, deciding instead on a more defensive (and less expensive) coastal posture. Funding was cut in half by 1910. By 1911, the government decided to cut the grant altogether.<sup>64</sup> As Britain began to move toward the end of the age of empire, it was harder and harder to generate the necessary national will to support military action. As the world moved closer and closer to world war, support for expeditions into the hinterlands of far off protectorates became less and less important.

Britain’s entry into World War I focused the resources of the crown away from its protectorates in Africa. The Mullah developed as a strong head of state, ruling over interior tribes through Islamic law. He began to reinforce the border areas of his Islamic state against his regional neighbors. The war also gave the Mullah the opportunity to improve his military posture through the accumulation of modern weapons, machine guns, and willing fighters. Even though their involvement in the war limited what they could do about it, the power of the Mullah bothered the British- " The continued immunity of the Mullah, who now stands alone as an un-subdued native potentate in Africa is a source of anxiety."<sup>65</sup>

As soon as the war ended with Britain on the victorious side, planning began to take action against the Mullah. The colonial office convinced the war office to use a new found instrument of

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<sup>62</sup> James, *Savage Wars*, 154.

<sup>63</sup> Silberman, “The Mad Mullah”, 529.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 531.

<sup>65</sup> James, *Savage Wars* 155.



power against the Mullah, the airplane. The airplane would give the British the necessary mobility that they needed to strike a decisive blow against the Mullah. On February 4<sup>th</sup>, 1920, the British flew one aircraft to the Mullah's headquarters at Taleh and dropped leaflets on the Somali fighters warning them to surrender and turn in the Mullah for a bounty, or face "birds of the air" that would destroy them.<sup>66</sup> The next day the Royal Air Force launched a heavy bombardment of the citadel at Taleh. The fort's walls held, but the psychological effect of the attack scattered the defenders across the countryside.<sup>67</sup> Although the Mullah escaped, he posed only a limited threat after the bombardment, conducting limited raids in small numbers. The British never captured or killed the Mad Mullah. He died of influenza November 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1920. As James says in *Savage Wars*, "the warfare of the Western Front had been imported into Africa to excise the last resister to British rule".<sup>68</sup>

The British Victorian Army's experience in the wars of pacification and punishment are interesting and insightful for many reasons. Using the terms of today, The British sought to achieve effects through force, and as expected, those effects were not always singularly assignable to the use of punitive force. Their punitive expeditions and columns often achieved the desired result through extreme force alone. The goals of these operations were deterrence and security, as opposed to revenge or retribution. Assessing how effective these operations were is very difficult. What can be done is to look at the tenets identified in the beginning of the chapter; overwhelming and sometimes brutal force, applied swiftly and decisively, against a technologically inferior enemy. What caused these components to change? On most occasions, external variables or entities injected other forces into the tactical problem, further diluting the good assessment of cause and effect. Public opinion at home, accepted conduct, cultural values all effected tactical execution in some way.

Campaigns of punishment and pacification had to be executed with sometimes brutal force. In many cases, brutal tactics *were expected* by native fighters, no matter how repulsive these tactics were in the *civil rear*. Force, especially brutal force worked, and was usually a requirement. The

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>67</sup> Silberman, "The Mad Mullah", 534.

<sup>68</sup> James, *Savage Wars*, 188.

British Army was inhibited by an interesting paradigm; the British people and government sympathy for its colonial adversaries increased over time, and the tactics of Army became further and further constrained. Major Baden-Powell summarized tactics for pacification, saying the natives must “be ruled with a hand of iron in a velvet glove...if they don’t understand the force of it...you must take off the glove for a moment and show them the hand—they will obey”<sup>69</sup>.

Contrast that outlook on force with the chase for the Mad Mullah, when homeland support of operations against the cleric were tenuous. In some circles in Britain, the Mullah was even characterized as a “freedom fighter”.<sup>70</sup> When the old Muslim fighter died in 1920, it was scarcely noticed by the British public. The news was relegated to simply interesting trivia. From one publication: “we live in stirring times, Willesden has won the London draughts championship and the Mad Mullah of Somaliland has been beaten again.”<sup>71</sup> Some saw even the final tool of the Mullah’s demise, the airplane, as inhumane.<sup>72</sup> To think that this was the same Army that had subjugated and pacified one of the world’s largest empires through force and deterrence.

A second observation about the punitive operations of Victorian Army is concerning the use of overwhelming force. In most instances, the British were able to achieve this force mismatch through better trained soldiers, more advanced and lethal weapons, and even a bit of superstition among some of their opponents. Overwhelming force is a critical component of punitive operations, achieved either through mass or technical advantage. Mismatch over your enemy is important because one must quickly satisfy the feeling of revenge of your own people, as well as establishing the cause and effect relationship between your enemies wrongdoings and your punishment of those acts.

Over time the British lost some of this technical mismatch. Opposing forces acquired better weapons, balancing the combat power of the forces. Additionally, familiarity over time reduced some of the supernatural and psychological effect of the more modern British weapons and training. *Absent a technological advantage, overwhelming force through mass may achieve a punitive effect.* In the

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 185.

<sup>70</sup> Silberman, “The Mad Mullah”, 535.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 534.

<sup>72</sup> James, *Savage Wars*, 190.

later years of the empire, high costs and other commitments hampered the British Army's ability to generate large forces for use against a single enemy or personality. This mismatch was once again achieved with the use of the airplane as a tool for combat. After having lost the advantage of technology and force size against the Mad Mullah in 1912, the British came back in 1920 and reasserted that imbalance with aircraft to a satisfactory effect. The aircraft made its debut as the "tool of choice" for punitive operations in 1920, and would play an important part in punitive operations from then on.

## Chapter 4: The U.S. Punitive Expedition, 1916

The success or failure of punitive strikes and expeditions is not easily discerned. Historically, these types of operations are poorly defined in terms of a clear strategic aim or political objective. In the history of the United States Army, the best example of just such an expedition is the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916. This short campaign was initiated as an armed response to Pancho Villa's night-time raid across the border into the town of Columbus, New Mexico in March of 1916. Villa raided the border town and killed 8 civilians, 10 soldiers, and pillaged and burned a number of structures. Villa's raid incited outrage in this country and calls for an immediate response by President Wilson. Americans felt anger and shock that such a bold attack could have been carried out on U.S. territory. The President responded by sending an expedition across the border led by General John Pershing with mission of breaking up or capturing the Villa Band.

The United States Government foreign policy toward Mexico had suffered through many changes since the Mexican revolution of 1910. Both the Taft and Wilson administrations had the challenge of advancing and protecting the United States' vast business interests in Mexico, protecting American citizens, and protecting the border. These Presidents also had the added challenge of determining which Mexican government to back among the constant revolutions and civil wars within the country. After the Revolution of 1910, the United States sought to bolster stability in the new Madero government through diplomatic means. Taft also created the 16,000 men "Maneuver Division" of U.S. troops and stationed it on the border to prevent the revolutionary instability from spilling into the United States. The Maneuver Division was also in place to possibly prepare for an invasion into Mexico proper.<sup>73</sup> By 1913 a military coup led by General Victorio Huerta had removed the Madero government and seized power. Madero was assassinated, and a civil war ensued between the Huerta and the supporters of Madero—(now known as the Carrancistas) and the militia of Pancho Villa. By 1915, the United States government had decided to stop all support of any other faction in Mexico other than to the Carrancistas. Wilson was not only influenced by the instability in the

country, but also by the apparent influence of Germany in shipping arms into Mexico to garner favor for a possible alliance to both Germany and Mexico's potential favor. This unilateral support of Carranza helped to exacerbate the splitting of Pancho Villa's small army from the Carrancistas. A general falling out had ensued between Carranza and Villa. Pancho Villa vowed to wage war against both Carranza and their supporter to the north, the United States.<sup>74</sup>

Not only did the Wilson administration use diplomacy and economic power to influence the Mexican domestic political situation, they used a strong military presence as well. President Wilson acted overtly to back the former Madero government factions in their battle for control of the Mexican Government. Wilson started to aid Carranza by supplying arms and other aid with the purpose of undermining the Huerta government. He also took action to protect the United States oil interest in the port city of Vera Cruz. This port city became a flash point in April of 1914, when "affronts" to the United States coupled with increasing concern of Germany's role in Mexico caused President Wilson to order the landing of over 700 U.S. Marines in the city. The landing was expectedly opposed by the Mexican soldiers who fought short street skirmishes with the Marines for a few days. The Army's Fifth Infantry Brigade followed the Marines, and began an occupation of the city that would last for 7 months.<sup>75</sup>

In one of the more unique acts of foreign policy in the last century, the U.S. Government was able to arm the Carrancistas by leaving a huge supply of arms, ammunition and equipment in the warehouses of the port city. Properly armed and equipped, the Carranza forces were able to succeed in defeating their opposition. By 1915, the United States had recognized the Carranza government as the legitimate Mexican government. Villa was further marginalized, outraged, and vengeful. The bandit vowed to "fight both Carranza and the United States, if necessary."<sup>76</sup>

In addition to the troubled foreign policy history between the United States and Mexico, there was also a litany of brutal attacks and murders of American citizens in the country. Between 1910 and

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<sup>73</sup> Mitchell Yockelson, "The United States Armed Forces and the Mexican Punitive Expedition: Part 1," *Prologue* 29, no 3 (Fall 1997): 1.

<sup>74</sup> Wilfred P. Deac, "Manhunt for Pancho Villa," *Military History* 19 (December 2002): 51.

<sup>75</sup> Yockleson, "United States Armed Forces" 2.

1916, these attacks had grown in brutality and magnitude and reverberated with the American sense of indignation toward Mexico. In December 1911, American plantation owner Frank Gillette was tied to a tree and executed while his wife watched. In April 1912, W.H Waite was kidnapped from an oilfield near Vera Cruz, robbed, and then *beheaded*. In February 1914, an outlaw chief named Castillo, wrecked a flatcar of burning lumber in the Cumbre Tunnel in the city of Chihuahua. A passenger train hit the burning car in the tunnel and killed all of the passengers. There were 14 Americans killed in the tunnel fire, including a mother and her five children. In January 1916, just sixty days before the Columbus attack employees of an American mining firm were attacked while enroute by train to the town of Cusi. A group of Villistas under orders from Pancho Villa stopped the train and robbed most of the passengers. The bandits then trotted all of the Americans outside, lined them up trackside and executed them. 17 Americans lay murdered on the rail grade when they were through.<sup>77</sup>

The spark that finally ignited the flames of anger and outrage in United States toward Pancho Villa was the nighttime border raid on the town of Columbus, New Mexico on March 9, 1916. Columbus was a sleepy border town of around 350 residents, primarily made up small board shacks, a bank, two hotels and the U.S Army garrison, Camp Furlong. The command at the Camp was around 500 soldiers of the 13<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment with Colonel Herbert J. Slocum as the Commanding officer.<sup>78</sup> The town was typical of the border towns of the area, cut into four quadrants by the railroad line that ran east to west through the town and a north-south road. It was located 3 miles from the international border with Mexico.

Moving across the international border at a point three miles to the west of the guarded border gate at the town of Palomas, Villa entered sovereign United States territory by cutting a barb wire fence. He quickly crossed, and began the three mile ride toward town. About one mile from town he divided his 500 bandits into two columns and prepared to strike the town. He had crossed in between

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<sup>76</sup> Deac, "Manhunt", 51.

<sup>77</sup> Herbert Malloy Mason Jr., *The Great Pursuit*, (New York: Random House, 1970) 63.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, 63.

the outpost positions that had been manned by a couple of squadrons, security measures that had been put in place by Colonel Slocum to attempt to interdict border crossing by bandits and criminals. Villa's strategy was to send one column toward the town, and have the other column strike at the garrison at Camp Furlong.

Although it was early morning hours of March 9, everyone was not fast asleep in the small town of Columbus. Second Lieutenant John P. Lucas had returned early that morning on the train from El Paso after enjoying a few days pass. Lucas, the commander of the machine gun troops, had just retired to his quarters to try and get some sleep after his seventy-five mile train ride on the "Drunkard's Special" from El Paso. He had noticed that his roommate, whose troop was on duty at the border had unloaded his service sidearm and taken his rounds. On a "hunch" as he called it, he decided for some reason to reload the revolver before undressing and getting into to bed.<sup>79</sup> He was awoke around 4:00 a.m. by the sounds of horses and men riding swiftly by his window. He was able to make out that they were Mexican by the shape of their hats. Lucas quickly donned his clothes and found his pistol. Bare-footed he prepared to defend himself against the attackers.<sup>80</sup>

There were other men and soldiers in the town that morning that would first engage the Mexicans. The Officer of the Day, First Lieutenant James P. Castleman, also responded to the attack by shooting a Mexican bandit at his front door. After this initial confrontation, he ran to the barracks of F Troop, and began to rally his squadron. Meanwhile LT Lucas was moving an ad hoc portion of his machine gun troop toward Villa's men in an attempt to place effective fire on the riders. The troop was armed with French made Benet-Mercier machineguns. Most of the other senior officers of the garrison, who had wives and children, were out of effective range of the fight, left to defend their homes and families. Although surprised, small groups under the good leadership were able to bring a good deal of firepower to bear upon the mounted raiders. Just before dawn, after three hours of fighting in the town, Villa's men started to withdraw.

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<sup>79</sup> Colonel Frank Tompkins, *Chasing Villa: The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition Into Mexico*, (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1934) 51. Report of the attack on Columbus by Lieutenant Lucas. Although many books state that he had a .45 automatic, he refers to his sidearm as a revolver in his report.

Major Frank Tompkins, one of the more senior officers of the garrison requested permission to pursue the withdrawing column. Colonel Slocum granted that permission, and Tompkins and Castlemen led a combined pursuit after Villa. They mounted around 50 troopers who began a pursuit of the retreating Villa in the true cavalry sense. Tompkins continued to fight Villa's rearguard, smashing every attempt at a defense the Mexicans undertook. As his horses began to tire, Major Tompkins halted his pursuit. He had penetrated 15 miles into the country of Mexico.

Although they had caught the town of Columbus by surprise, the operation was certainly not a success for the Villistas.<sup>81</sup> They had suffered some 100 killed and 30 captured. The Americans in Columbus losses were eight civilians and ten soldiers killed, with 9 wounded. When Major Tompkins began his return march to the garrison, he passed by dead and wounded Villistas and scattered abandoned equipment the whole way back to camp. The pursuit column reached Columbus about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. When they arrived, the outraged citizens and soldiers had already dragged sixty-seven dead Mexicans to the outskirts of town and were burning them.<sup>82</sup> The anger of the town of Columbus had already begun to spread around the country.

The attack on Columbus caused a response by the Government of the United States to avenge the nation's loss. Taken in the context of our discussion of revenge and force, the attack by Villa on American soil, and the killing of civilians in the town left little options for President Wilson other than to somehow avenge the wrong. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, a response to seek revenge or punishment for this attack would be within the customs and laws of war. The people of the United States were no doubt interested in seeking retribution for the attack, and would support (and expect) military action to be taken. President Wilson was faced with the challenge of achieving the effect of revenge while balancing the other national interest at the time, staying out of a larger war, and still being seen as responding to the outrage of Columbus.

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<sup>80</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit*, 14.

<sup>81</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 185.

<sup>82</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit* 20.



The story of the attack on Columbus began to spread throughout the country almost immediately by the standards of the day. Telegraphs and telephones, aided by an Associated Press correspondent who just happened to be in Columbus, pushed the news to the President by 9:00 o'clock that morning. The president's civilian and military advisors all called for an immediate military response for retribution against Villa. There was action and cooperation among all of the diplomatic and military instruments of the government. State began to pressure Carranza to act internally, while the Department of War began to construct a military response. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, (who had just taken office three days prior) began to issue orders to the Army Chief of Staff, General Hugh Scott. The exchange is important in understanding what the actual strategic objective was for the expedition. The initial order to the military was to move "at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays." The Army Chief replied "Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to make war on one man? Suppose he should get into a train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America; are you going to go after him?"<sup>83</sup> Baker of course did not mean that, and General Scott was able to translate the order into a more realistic military objective, "the work will be considered finished as soon as Villa's band or bands are known to be broken up."<sup>84</sup>

The man that the War Department chose to command the punitive expedition was General John Joseph Pershing. Pershing was uniquely qualified for the job, having participated in the hunt for Geronimo, the Spanish American War in Cuba, and the Philippine Insurrection. Pershing knew the realities of the mission, and was cognizant of just how his force would have to walk a fine line between invasion force and pursuit force.<sup>85</sup> He began to quickly assemble a force from around the southwest of 4,800 men of the 7<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 13<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, and the 6<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiments. The initial movements of the force were conducted in two separate columns. The first column of the 13<sup>th</sup> regiment was led by Major Frank Tompkins and crossed into Mexico on March 16, 1916 straight from

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<sup>83</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 189.

<sup>84</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit*, 70.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, 82.

Columbus. The second column, led by Colonel William Brown, crossed 50 miles away and to the west. Pershing and his headquarters traveled with the second column. Pershing's plan was for the two columns to quickly converge seventy-five miles south of the border at a town called Casas Grande. From there, the command would formulate a plan to find and envelope Villa's raiders.

The punitive expedition was at its heart, a cavalry operation. In fact, it was the last cavalry operation that the Army executed and the end of the era of horse cavalry. The basic tactic that Pershing intended to employ was to use the highly mobile and lightly equipped "flying columns" of horse cavalry to seek and destroy Villa's band. The concept of converging columns had gotten its start in the Indian Wars, and had proven somewhat effective in enveloping a wily, fast moving foe. Pershing would attempt to use these fast moving columns to penetrate deep into the mountainous areas of Chihuahua in order to surround and destroy Villa's band and with luck capture Villa himself.

Pershing was limited in his freedom of action to pursue Villa from the start. Wilson's policies forbade any action that looked as if the U.S. Army was mounting an invasion or an occupation of Mexico.<sup>86</sup> This meant that the use of rail lines, towns as logistical bases, or any other action that would give the perception to the Carranza government that this was an invasion as opposed to a punitive action was prohibited.

One of the revolutionary aspects of the Punitive Expedition was the use of airplanes as a part of the operation. Secretary of War Newton Baker had authorized the use of the First Aero Squadron, based at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio Texas to be used by Pershing in support of his operations. The squadron was made up of 10 officers, eighty-two enlisted men, and eight JN-3 "Jenny" single engine biplanes. A sturdy and certainly crash-worthy aircraft, the Jenny's were not designed for the rigors of combat. It was unarmed, had a top speed of only eighty miles per hour, and did not have the power needed to fly over the foothills much less the mountains of the Sierras.<sup>87</sup> The Jenny's were to be used primarily as an observation platform to gather reconnaissance. The record of the effectiveness

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 81.

<sup>87</sup> James S. Corum, and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003) 16.

of Airpower to accomplish that mission is poor. Plagued by mechanical problems and the harsh environment, the air squadron contributions were negligible in supporting the mission. In spite of this, the pilots and crews performed some truly heroic feats during the expedition.<sup>88</sup>

Pershing faced other problems in gaining intelligence about where exactly Villa was. The Mexicans who inhabited the countryside were not reliable sources of information on Villa's movements. The people of Mexico were generally apathetic to the plight of Pershing's forces who were trying to catch a man who many considered a national hero. Most Mexicans who were in the small towns "frankly said that they would consider it a national disgrace if the Americans should capture Villa." A similar feeling among the foreigners in Mexico, mostly American, who believed that their interests were better served by a large U.S. military force in Mexico. This group hoped that the expedition would not catch Villa either, for it would mean the withdrawal of the troops. Both of these groups made it difficult for Pershing to obtain human intelligence on the whereabouts of Villa and his band.

As the expedition moved further and further south into Mexico, they had scattered success in a few engagements against the Villistas. Pershing had decided to catch Villa he must continue to push columns south. He gave orders to his commanders that had them move in four parallel columns southward deeper into Mexico. In addition to locating Villa, the regular Mexican forces under Carranza had begun to cool to the prospect of an invading American force operating with impunity throughout the countryside. Pershing's men were not only fighting the Villistas, but they were now fighting the Carranza forces as well. Pershing's need to balance the mission of catching Villa and not becoming involved with the Government of Mexico was now slipping away.

The fight at the town of Parral is indicative of this. In mid April, the 13<sup>th</sup> Cavalry column led by Major Frank Tompkins had penetrated the deepest into Mexico of any U.S. force to date. Tompkins was met short of town by a Carranza government representative who told them that they would be welcomed in the town, their horses cared for and the men provided for as well. After weeks

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 19.

of hard riding by these cavalrymen, the conveniences of Parral with its 20,000 inhabitants would be a welcome change from the rigors of the trail.<sup>89</sup> The situation in Parral would not prove to be as welcoming as hoped. When Major Tompkins reached the town with his troopers, he was immediately told by a General officer from the Carranza national forces that he should have never entered the town and should leave immediately. Tompkins wisely began to withdraw the column from this untenable situation.

As the 13<sup>th</sup> cavalry withdrew from the town, they came under fire from the government forces. Tompkins mounted a rear guard action to buy time to withdraw to a defensible piece of terrain outside the town, and was able to hold with few losses until the force reached a small walled village eight miles from Parral. The situation did not look favorable, with 100 U.S. Cavalrymen facing down some 500-600 regular troops from the Constitutionalist government.<sup>90</sup> Major Tompkins had sent a courier to contact elements of the 10<sup>th</sup> Cavalry some 10 miles away to apprise them of his predicament. Tompkins had then entered into a note writing exchange with the commander of the Mexican forces, and was hoping to continue this endeavor in order to buy time for the reinforcing 10<sup>th</sup> Cavalry to arrive. This plan seemed to work as the 10<sup>th</sup> arrived in short order and the Constitutionalist withdrew back to Parral.<sup>91</sup>

The fight at Parral is significant for many reasons. It would be the furthest southern penetration in to Mexico by Pershing's expedition, some 516 miles. It was also the beginning of the change in the mission of not only fighting the Villistas but the Carranza Government forces as well. Time had not befriended the U.S. Army. The longer the hunt for Villa went on, and the deeper they drove into the interior of Mexico, the more enemies they seem to mobilize among the people as well as the government forces. Pershing believed that only by bringing the full power of the United States military against the problems in Mexico would they be able to accomplish the mission. Pershing related to his superiors that only "an arduous campaign of considerable length" would solve the

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<sup>89</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 195.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 196.

<sup>91</sup> Tompkins, *Chasing Villa*, 143.

problem of defeating Villa. He wanted permission to seize the Mexican state of Chihuahua, as well as full access to the national rail system of Mexico.<sup>92</sup> Pershing understood that it would be difficult to continue the mission without a lifting of the present constraints.

The situation in Mexico was in need of a change of strategy. The hunt for Villa was at a stalemate. The president sent General Hugh Scott, the Chief of Staff of the Army to San Antonio to meet with General Funston in order to assess the current strategy. The two recommended to President Wilson that either Pershing be allowed to move further south in pursuit of Villa, or that he be withdrawn from Mexico altogether. The ultimate decision was to move the headquarters farther north to Nuevo Casas Grande, a half-measure that was a compromise of both of the recommended strategies.<sup>93</sup> The situation and the actions taken after Parral would start the slow diminishment of the expedition in Mexico. The kinds of drastic measure that Pershing advocated, measure that he knew where the only acceptable military conditions that would achieve some potential for success, were not acceptable to a president who was concerned about the larger world environment. Wilson decided on an exit strategy that would diminish the disgrace of withdrawing the expedition altogether without killing Villa, and still throttle the advance to avoid the potential of a larger war with Mexico.<sup>94</sup>

In spite of a continued concern from Washington regarding the vulnerability of the expedition, Pershing continued to aggressively hunt Villistas in the northern part of Chihuahua. General Funston urged Pershing to consolidate his forces to prevent a decisive attack by the Mexican government forces. Pershing continued to pursue the Villista bands, killing two of Villa's top generals and a number of Villa's soldiers. These battles had been the most successful to date in terms of capturing or killing Villa's bandits. These successes were short lived, as the border between the United States and Mexico seemed to be as porous to bandit attacks as ever, at least from the point of view of Washington. Four attacks into American border towns during May and June of 1916 left a number of Americans dead or kidnapped. This caused such fervor in Washington and around the

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<sup>92</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 197.

<sup>93</sup> Joseph A. Stout Jr., *Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915-1920*, (Dallas: Texas Christian University Press, 1999) 58.

<sup>94</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit*, 148.

country, that President Wilson ordered the mobilization of the National Guard to protect the border. The tension between the countries was high, and it seemed that any spark would plunge the neighbors into full-scale war. The Mexicans wanted the Punitive expedition out of Mexico; the United States wanted the Mexicans to control their outlaws and bandits. The United States was prepared to invade northern Mexico to accomplish this task if the Mexicans could not do it themselves.<sup>95</sup> As the United States moved over 100,000 troops to the border, the Carrancistas had deployed over 25,000 troops in the vicinity of Pershing's main base at Nueva Casa Grande. The diplomats were in full exchanges of salvos between the two governments. It would take only the smallest spark to set off a chain of events that could lead to the second Mexican War.

The fight at the town of Carrizal proved to be that spark. In June of 1916 Pershing made the decision to send a small force south toward the town of Ahumada, seventy-five miles from Casas Grande. Pershing knew that Carranza regular forces were moving closer to his position, and he lacked intelligence about where these forces were. To gain that intelligence, he sent a small force of 43 troopers from under the command of Captain Charles Boyd of the 10<sup>th</sup> Cavalry. Pershing knew that sending this force further south could jeopardize the tenuous state of affairs between the armies by provoking the Mexicans into a larger fight with Pershing, and even larger war with the United States. Boyd, an aggressive and ambitious young officer,<sup>96</sup> led his small troop south to find the Carranza forces. His route took him to the town of Carrizal. Carrizal was occupied by at least 400 Carranza regulars, and in spite the best advice of his other officers and Pershing's orders, Boyd was intent on riding through Carrizal and provoking a fight with Carrancistas.

As Boyd brought his troopers into skirmish formation and advanced, he came under fire from machinegun and rifle fire from the front and flanks. The Mexicans continued to advance, and the 10<sup>th</sup> Cavalry began to suffer casualties. Captain Boyd was killed, and the command was being quickly engaged by accurate Mexican rifle fire. The small cavalry force had to retreat to avoid a complete rout. The outcome was 12 U.S. killed, 10 wounded, and 24 taken prisoner. The Mexicans had

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<sup>95</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 198.

suffered casualties as well, but the defeat was more of a disaster for the Americans.<sup>97</sup> Boyd's decision to provoke a fight at Carrizal stirred the pot of war between both countries. Both sides thought that this incident would plunge the countries into war. Neither President Wilson nor President Carranza wanted war between Mexico and the United States, were able through diplomacy to avert a larger conflict. The disaster at Carrizal would mark the end of active operations to hunt down Pancho Villa. For the next seven months, Pershing's forces remained consolidated and encamped at Colonia Dublan, just seventy-five miles south of their starting point, Columbus, New Mexico.<sup>98</sup>

During the time Pershing was restricted to his bivouac at Colonia Dublan, Villa became more powerful in the Chihuahua region. He began to actively recruit and conducted attacks on the Carranza forces in the region. This was almost too much for Pershing to stand, restricted to camp by Wilson with Villa roaming the countryside within a few miles of the Pershing's 10,000 garrisoned troops.<sup>99</sup> Wilson and the rest of the administration were concerned about another Carrizal, and forbade Pershing to mount any offensive action to find Villa. It would seem that the larger issues of avoiding a continental war outweighed the need to avenge the attack on Columbus the year before.

On January 12, 1916, the President ordered the Punitive Expedition withdrawn from Mexico. Pershing received those orders a week later and readied his troops for movement north. The Administration withheld the public announcement that the expedition would be withdrawn until the troops were moving north.<sup>100</sup> The entire expedition of 10,690 men, 9,307 horses, 2,030 Mexican, 197 American, and 533 Chinese refugees had closed on the border gate at Palomas by February 4, 1917. They began crossing the border into the United States on February 5, 1917.<sup>101</sup>

The argument on whether the punitive expedition was successful is inconclusive in history. It has been referred to by historians as a "wild goose chase", "prolonged, famous fumble", and even a

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<sup>96</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit*, 208.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, 210.

<sup>98</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 200.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, 200.

<sup>100</sup> Mason, *The Great Pursuit*, 231.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, 232.

“dirty little war”<sup>102</sup> Some would argue that if anything, it was successful because it prepared the Army for the very near task of fighting in the Great War in Europe. It could also be considered a success because Pershing did accomplish, at least in a limited sense, his mission of breaking up the Villa band.<sup>103</sup> The observations that historians like Max Boot make that preparation of the Army to fight the First World War is a benefit of the expedition that is serendipitous. Let us look at the success or failure of the expedition in terms of its original purpose—avenging Pancho Villa’s attack on Columbus Mexico.

There are two observations that can be made about the Mexican Punitive Expedition and our general framework for punitive operations. The first is an understanding of how important *timeliness* is to the success of punitive measures. The second observation is that an attack to punish another state or actor must use a force that is empowered to accomplish the mission. Overwhelming and decisive force is paramount to achieving initial success. Without the potential to win decisively as well as quickly, the operation becomes an invasion or an attack, but not a punitive strike.

One of the most important failures of the expedition was to effectively use time to the advantage of American Force. The Army needed to understand how very important it would be to quickly penetrate deeply into Mexico before too much time elapsed between the attack on Columbus and Villa’s retreat south. The longer the force went without the tangible results of dead or captured Villistas, the harder it would be to continue the operation. The initial empowerment of the force to use the railroads, for example, could have allowed them to quickly deploy deep to the south, and then fight back towards the north to push Villa against the border. Instead, Wilson’s desire to limit the forces’ activities so they would not be seen as “occupiers” prevented them from acting quickly. It was also critical for the leadership to understand at the outset that the expedition was limited in the amount of time that it could operate in Mexico. There is certainly no hard and fast number of days or months associated with this type of time limit. It is essentially decided based upon the general attitude of the

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, 231.

<sup>103</sup> Boot, *Savage Wars*, 202.



American people in this case. It is a more nuanced feeling of just what would be necessary to achieve the feeling among the American people that the attacks by the Mexican bandits had been avenged.

For example, in late May, Pershing forces had fought the command's most successful engagements against Villa's forces. In short order they had killed a number of Villa's men, including killing the Villista general who had personally led the attack on Columbus. This may have been a good time to assess the "ripeness" of the expedition for success. Even Pershing understood that the expedition must be empowered to either wage a larger war in Mexico, or withdraw. Instead, the compromise achieved neither a successful exploitation of the capture of two of Villa's top generals, nor a broadening of the campaign to allow Pershing to wage a more rigorous assault on Villa in northern Mexico. The Punitive expedition remained in Mexico for *eight months* after this.

Pershing's forces were not large enough to accomplish the mission as it continued to expand. There should have been a recognition after Parral that now that Pershing was engaged with not only the forces of Villa, but more routinely with regular army troops of the Carranza government, that the expedition had become something other than an operation to punish Villa. A punitive operation must have sufficient forces to accomplish its object quickly and with overwhelming military force. When a punitive act pits two near equal forces against each other, as was the case when Pershing was fighting both the Carrancistas and the Villistas, *it is no longer a punitive action*. Pershing's force should have either been properly resourced to wage a limited war against Mexico and occupy Northern Mexico (as Pershing recommended), or withdrawn. The cavalymen of the expedition were not involved in a punitive response once they became engaged with regular army forces of the Mexican government.

## Chapter 5: Operation El Dorado Canyon; Libya, 1986

Our final historical example of punitive action is the United States attack on Libya as retribution for terrorist acts against United States citizens and interests. Carried out April 14 1986 as a punitive air strike against key Libyan leadership and infrastructure targets, Operation El Dorado Canyon was the military execution of President Reagan's doctrine of "swift and effective retribution" as a response to terrorists acts. El Dorado Canyon was the culmination of a strategy that was intended to place diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the leader of Libya to deter or punish Libyan support of terror. El Dorado Canyon was punitive in the sense that it was a direct response to avenge a wrong by Libya, as well as being viewed in the larger sense as a method of deterrence against future acts of terror or support of terrorism in the future.

The historical diplomatic relationships between the United States and the North African country of Libya have always been poor. Of the last 200 years, only 20 of them have seen positive relations between the two nations.<sup>104</sup> The most recent leader of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, rose to power in Libya during the One September Revolution in 1969. Arab unity and promoting Arab nationalism was a central goal of his regime. A critical part of Qaddafi's foreign policy was the support of terrorism against the West. As early as 1969, the Qaddafi regime was actively supporting the terrorist activities of a number of groups, including Fatah, the Poplar Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and even the Irish Republican Army. This support of terrorism was broad, with Libya providing financial, training, and leadership support to many of the terrorist acts that occurred between 1970 and 1986. Paul Wilkinson, a British terrorism expert said, "if there were a Nobel Prize for terrorism, Qaddafi would surely be the obvious candidate."<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Ronald Bruce St. John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) 1.

<sup>105</sup> Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990) 10.

By the late 1970's most western heads of state considered Qaddafi as one of leading supporters and executors of international terrorism.<sup>106</sup> Relations with the United States were further strained during the seventies when Libya nationalized American oil interest in the country following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Additionally, Libyan policies regarding the freedom of navigation rights to the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean were a source of conflict. Qaddafi announced on October 11, 1973 that the entire Gulf of Sidra was now within the sovereign territory of the Libyan Arab Republic, and that the extent of this territory reached northward to the latitude 32 degrees 30 minutes.<sup>107</sup> This was nonnegotiable to the United States and other countries, as it was a violation of international law and an obstacle to shipping lanes in the waterway.

Throughout the rest of the 1970's, the United States conducted very little to challenge Libya on either terrorism or the Gulf of Sidra issue. President Carter authorized the Navy to conduct three freedom of navigation exercises in the vicinity of the "line of death"<sup>108</sup> in the Gulf of Sidra, designed to demonstrate to the Libya that they could not back up their claims with military action. This effort by the Navy was shaped, however, by President Carter's guarded policy toward provoking Libya and causing a wider expansion to armed conflict.<sup>109</sup> Certainly the Carter administration was operating in the context of the realities of the Cold War, as well as the situation in Iran. Despite this lenient policy, the situation in Libya continued to degrade when students attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, December, 1979. Relations deteriorated sharply during the next two years with the closing of mutual embassy missions in 1980 and 1981.

The 1980's and the Reagan administration saw the further decline of U.S. Libyan relations, further promulgated by a ever increasing number of terrorist activities by the Libyan regime. One of the most significant from the American people's perspective occurred in 1981. In August of that year the CIA reported that a Palestinian official had met with a member of the Libyan General

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<sup>106</sup> Joseph T. Stanick, "Swift and Effective Retribution" *The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi*. The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series No. 3. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1996) 23.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, 27.

<sup>108</sup> The "Line of Death" refers to the latitude 32 degrees 30 minutes, the entrance to the Gulf of Sidra.

<sup>109</sup> Joseph T. Stanick, *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003) 30.

Staff and had cooperated on a plan to attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.<sup>110</sup> A few months later, in December the *New York Times* broke a story that alleged that five members of a Libyan assassination hit team had entered the United States and was planning an attack on President Reagan.<sup>111</sup> Although never proven, it was believed to be a credible threat. This act alone focused country's mind on the possible dangers that Libya presented, and increased the administration's proclivity to harsher measures against Qaddafi.

During the early nineteen eighties the United States' focus was on containing Libyan influence within the region, as opposed to countering terrorism.<sup>112</sup> This was accomplished primarily through stiff economic and diplomatic sanctions to attempt to destabilize the Libyan government, possibly setting the conditions for an internal coup.<sup>113</sup> Some of this pressure may have been effective, as there were no terrorist act during 1982 or 1983 that could be attributed to Libya. This began to change in 1984, with an uptrend of lethal terrorists acts directly or indirectly supported by the Libyan government. The Reagan administration also began to develop a foreign policy that made military force a primary tool in fighting terrorism. On April 3 1984, Reagan signed NSDD 138 a directive that authorized the use of preemptive and retaliatory strikes against terrorist organizations and the states that support them.<sup>114</sup> The attacks would only continue to increase.

1985 brought on a rash of terrorist attacks in the world that were either explicitly or implicitly sponsored by Libya. One of the most significant was the June 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 by members of Hezbollah. The hijacking occurred on a flight from Athens to Rome, and was covered in real time, 24 hours a day by the world news media. The plane was routed from Beirut to Algiers and finally settled in Beirut, where a shocked American audience watched as the hijackers executed a U.S. Navy Petty officer and threw his body onto the tarmac. The hijackers then took 37 American hostages off the aircraft and moved them into the city proper. They were eventually released through the

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>111</sup> Philip Taubman, "U.S. Officials Say F.B.I. Is Hunting Terrorists Seeking to Kill President", *The New York Times*. December 4, 1981, 1.

<sup>112</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi & Terrorism*, 49.

<sup>113</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, 58.

<sup>114</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi & Terrorism*, 64.

involvement of the Syrian government and Assad. This action was a turning point in President Reagan's attitudes of how the nation should respond toward terrorist acts. Reagan's biographer said that the hijacking openly "mocked" the rhetoric of the administrations recent rhetoric of "swift and effective retribution" against terrorists, and Reagan would use the next opportunity to satisfy the nation's demand for vengeance against terrorist acts.<sup>115</sup> The administration began planning for immediate military retribution in the event of another attack.

The next terrorist incidents in 1985 further pushed the Reagan administration toward military action against Libya. In October 1985, Terrorists from the Palestinian Liberation Front group Abu Nidal took control of the Italian pleasure cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. The terrorists killed one American; a wheel chair bound elderly man named Leon Klinghoffer. Americans were outraged when they learned that this old man had been shot and his body thrown overboard. One month later simultaneous machine guns attacks at the International Airports in Rome and Vienna left over one hundred people wounded and twenty dead. Five of the dead were Americans. United States intelligence inferred a link between Libya and these attacks by Abu Nidal. The United States would put a response in motion, and it would start in the Mediterranean.

In order to put overt military pressure on the Libyan leader, the United States Navy launched a series of naval operations dubbed *Attain Document*. *Attain Document* was a series of operations conducted in the waters and skies in the Mediterranean to exhibit freedom of navigation. The exercise began in January of 1986 and were primarily U.S. Naval missions built around the Sixth Fleet and Commanded by the Sixth Fleet Commander. In addition to testing Libya's claim regarding the Gulf of Sidra, the operation was also an attempt to provoke the Libyan military into striking out at United States aircraft or ships. This tactic worked. During the final operation, *Attain Document III*, the Sixth Fleet forces attacked Libya ground based air defense sites, and fired anti-shiping missiles at three hostile Libyan warships. However limited the action against Libya was, the American people seemed

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<sup>115</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, 98-99.

to overwhelmingly support the response. A *Newsweek* poll reported that seventy-five percent of Americans supported the President's actions.<sup>116</sup>

The Reagan Administration realized the Qaddafi was not the whole terrorist problem, but thought that by retaliating and punishing him it would have a deterrence effect upon other states, especially Syria and Iran. The United States had been publicly touting a doctrine of reprisal against terrorism. The Labelle Disco bombing was a chance to make good on this doctrine.<sup>117</sup> In the early morning hours of April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded at the La Belle disco in West Berlin. The damage was catastrophic. The strike wounded 229 people, including 79 Americans. The blast also killed 2 American soldiers. The United States and its allies believed that they had "inconvertible proof" that the attack had been the work of Libyan supported agents. The night of the attack, foreign and allied intelligence sources had intercepted radio traffic coordinating the attack with Libyan officials.

The conclusive evidence linking Libya to the disco bombing allowed the United States to put a plan in motion to strike Libya in retaliation for its terrorists activities. The objectives of the response were clear. Attacking Libya would achieve both military and political objectives. The military objective would be served because it would be an act of self-defense against future terrorists acts. The attack would also accomplish a much *more important* political objective, serving to satisfy the feelings of anger held by the American people.<sup>118</sup>

On April 14, 1986, United States Navy and Air Force aircraft conducted a night bombing raid on targets within Libya. Air Force F-111F Bombers, along with Navy F-18/A and A-6E carrier based combat aircraft, bombed military targets in the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. One of the targets was Qaddafi's command and control facility at Aziziyah. The raid was a military success, resulting in the destruction of numerous Libyan air defense units, the destruction of Libyan Air Force fighters, and to Qaddafi's underground bunker. The raid killed thirty-seven Libyans, including

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>117</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi & Terrorism*, 121.

<sup>118</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, 146.

Qaddafi's daughter, and injured Qaddafi's two sons. Two U.S. crewman of a F-111 were declared killed in action after the raid.

President Reagan addressed the nation the night of the attack and explained to the American people why he felt it was in the interest of the United States to carry out the raid. He stressed Qaddafi's culpability in harming Americans through his support of terrorism. He also read parts of the intelligence intercept about the disco bombing. Although this revealed a sensitive piece of intelligence information, Political advisors believed that it important to establish credibility for the raid with the American people. The President felt it was important in his speech to establish the sense that America was provoked, and that this response was a last resort. He also attempted to appeal to the country's sense of vengeance by underscoring that the attack was in response to a wrong that had been committed by Libya.<sup>119</sup>

The punitive strike on Libya has been regarded by history as a successful punitive response to terrorist acts by Libya. The military planning accomplished very discreet political and strategic objectives, objectives that were limited in scope but sufficient. The raid illustrates the successful application of a number of the tenets of punitive response that we have identified in the two preceding examples. The objective was limited and overwhelming force was applied against the objectives. The raid was timely, and the United States government attempted to establish a linkage between the actions of Libya and our response as retribution for those acts. The President understood the need to appeal to the human emotions of vengeance and revenge among the American people. The strike accomplished that need to lash out with force.

The most difficult distinction to make regarding Operation El Dorado Canyon and all punitive attacks is how to judge *effectiveness*. In one sense, the short scope objective of obtaining immediate and quantifiable revenge is very important. A more difficult question to answer is whether the raid was successful in deterring other terrorist acts by Libya and other groups over time. In a paper published in 1994, Dr. Henry Pruncken conducted a statistical analysis of whether there was a

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<sup>119</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi & Terrorism*, 138.

reduction in worldwide terrorist activity following the punitive strike on Libya. His conclusion is that there was. His analysis bears out that the raid reduced the number of Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks against Americans. His quantifiable analysis does not prove that the raid was a cause of the reduction in terrorism, but that there was a strong positive correlation between the two.<sup>120</sup> What makes his observations difficult to understand is *time*. Our context following the attacks of September 11, 2001 is that terrorism has increased significantly since 1986. This observation is important, because it underscores the idea that measuring success in using force for revenge or deterrence is difficult.

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<sup>120</sup> Henry Walter J. Prunckun, "Operation El Dorado Canyon: A Military Solution to the Law Enforcement Problem of Terrorism. A Quantitative Analysis." M.S. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1994.



## **Conclusion: The Success of Punitive Strikes**

We began this discussion of punitive strikes to determine what make punitive expeditions or attacks a success or failure. Determining this is difficult. Often using force for revenge accomplishes an aim that is tough to quantify, appealing a satisfaction of vengeance or deterrence of future actions by an adversary. There are, however, some overarching elements of punitive strikes, and these have been apparent throughout history. These elements may inform future responses toward recalcitrant nations or terrorist actors. The elements of punitive attack are not definite, but they seem to represent important components that are evident in attacks and expeditions of the past.

**Revenge is a uniquely human emotion, and an enduring cause of war.** Religion and divine intercession were used as a backplane to justify killing for revenge since the days of the Old Testament. The manner in which humans think about punitive war has not changed over time, no matter how other attitudes about war may have changed. War for revenge is a uniquely human endeavor, and as such, must be understood in the context of other human emotions. The attitudes, emotions and values of the attacking nation must be such that they underwrite the action. There is a moral component to punitive attack. The attacker must understand that his retaliation will be viewed both externally and internally as in the context of right or wrong. Because revenge is innate, it will not diminish as a cause of war.

Revenge shaped the response in two of our examples, the expedition against Poncho Villa and the strikes against Libya. In both of these cases, the United States government reacted to an attack on United States citizens or territory. In these two expeditions, feelings of vengeance and the outrage of the nation were integral to ensuring that there was public and allied support for the action. The attack by Poncho Villa on the town of Columbus gave the Wilson administration all of the political capital that it needed to initiate a response. In fact, the need for revenge/vengeance became a requirement, one that exerted pressure on the administration to react with force whether it would support larger strategic objectives of the nation or not. It could be said that the pressure to strike back against Villa

took on a life of its own, forcing President Wilson to balance the American people's sense of vengeance with the larger goal of averting an all out war with Mexico.

In the case of Libya, revenge was a necessary element to justify the strike in the United States as well as in the international community, regardless of the difficulty that the United States had in securing allied support. President Reagan used the terrorist attack on the La Belle Discotheque as the tripwire to initiate a military response that would have been much more difficult to justify had there not been American casualties. In hindsight, it is apparent that the Reagan administration may have desired to strike Libya before 1986, and even used naval and air exercises in the Mediterranean to try to provoke Quaddafi. It was not until the administration could categorically link Libya to terrorist attacks on United States citizens (think *civis Romanus sum*) that it felt it had the needed license to launch a retaliatory strike. Conversely, in the case of the British in Somaliland, we see where a *lack* of a feeling of revenge among the British people affected the Crown's ability to quell the Mad Mullah. The British people, and therefore the government, had no reason to feel a need to avenge any wrong, dissolving the ability of the British Military to continue to underwrite the chase for the Mullah in far away Somaliland. A lack of emotion or passion concerning killing the Mullah increased the difficulty in obtaining real monetary or other support for the expedition.

Retribution has always been an accepted cause of war. Theorists on war have included revenge in their writings and thoughts, and revenge persisted from Greek times into the twentieth century. Regardless of this fact, more modern international agreements on war and conflict do not include revenge as an instigator or cause. The world wars of the last century gave nations the impetus to outlaw aggressive war, to make war illegal. Early international agreements like the Covenant of the League of Nations left out references to revenge and retribution as a grounds for war. Additionally, the Charter of the United Nations, does not recognize retribution or vengeance as a legitimate cause of conflict. Given the historical precedence of vengeance as a just cause of war, it is unrealistic to think that modern nations or other entities would *not* act with force to avenge a wrong.

**The response must be warranted and timely.** The objective of punitive strike is to punish. If there is not sufficient proof that some injury or damage has occurred, it will be increasingly difficult

to justify. The passage of time will compound this. A response should be carried out as quickly as possible after sustaining the foreign attack or insult. The perceptions among key allies, the target entity, and the American people are critical in assessing the timing of the response. It is important to understand also that the entity or nation will more closely associate its transgressions with the punitive action the less time there is between the *action* and the *reaction*.

In El Dorado Canyon, the United States government understood that the timing of the operation would be important in establishing the needed credibility for the strike. Although there may have been sufficient evidence to link Libya to numerous terrorist attacks prior to La Belle, The administration chose to wait until there was incontrovertible proof that Libya had sponsored the bombings. The retribution was swift and the attack was completed quickly. In contrast, The Pershing Expedition languished for several months in a operational stasis, unable to expand the mission, but also unable to reduce it. Similarly, the British in Somaliland worked for several years to pacify the Mullah or destroy his Army. Absent the needed forces or the resources, they were unable to exert sufficient force upon the Mullah to persuade him to cease and desist or kill him outright.

Technological advances and operational reach have given the military planners the ability to reduce the action to reaction time to mount a response. Given the British Army's long quest to destroy the Mad Mullah, it is notable that they only achieved success when they introduced the airplane into the operation. Similarly, El Dorado Canyon made good use of air and sea power to strike quickly at high value targets in Libya, negating the problem of supporting a long deployment of ground forces. This is *not* to say that air power is the single best instrument for executing punitive strikes. Non-state actors who operate boundless groups or networks, may require forces that operate within the necessary granularity of the environment. It will be difficult to carry out punitive operations against these types of entities without a combination of force types and capabilities.

**The response must use overwhelming force against a limited, attainable objective.** The objective for the strike or expedition must be attainable, and the risk to mission success small. Certainly, these are factors that pertain to all military operations, but for a punitive action they apply in a unique and subtle way. Punitive strikes are responses, motivated by revenge or as a tool for

dissuasion. The more symmetry or parity that exists between the two parties, the more limited the objective of the punitive strike. Should the action or campaign not obtain the strategic objectives or be resourced fully, it becomes another type of operation altogether. During the Mexican Punitive Expedition, General Pershing's mission to "break up Villa's band" was a realistic and prudent revision from the initial goal of "killing Poncho Villa". Pershing was not however, given the necessary resources to complete this mission in short order and withdraw across the border. Restraints on use of Mexican railroads, supplies and villages hampered the expeditions' operations, and made it more difficult to accomplish its objectives. Pershing may have had a large force, but it was not large enough given the size of territory and the need for expeditious results. It should not be lost on military planners that *expedition* and *expedite* share a common etymology.<sup>121</sup>

Contrast the Mexican Punitive Expedition with the punitive strikes on Libya. President Reagan set attainable political objectives for the military, and allowed the military to allocate the necessary resources to accomplish the tasks quickly and effectively. The objectives of the raids were not only feasible, but they could be accomplished rapidly. In a punitive strike, the combination of success delivered quickly is integral in linking the strike to punishment for the offender and retribution for the aggrieved. The strike on Libya was seen as a successful operation, and one that had an effect on Libya's support of terrorist actions.

**Measures of effectiveness for punitive attack or response are difficult to determine, and may not discernible at all.** Revenge satisfaction among the American people or her allies is a difficult thing to measure. Quantifiable measures of effectiveness have become dogma, with planners data-mining measurable variables, and blindly attributing cause and effect to those variables. Vengeance may not be measurable. Avenging a wrong is wrapped in emotion, and, just as Army Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott did for Secretary of War Newton Baker, may require skillful translation of emotions into objectives that are feasible and acceptable. However difficult it may be to determine, it cannot be stressed enough *how important revenge is as a driver for the use of force*. The

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<sup>121</sup> From the Latin *expeditus*, literally meaning "free the feet from fetters".

danger here seems to be one of not knowing that you have achieved success, and of not knowing exactly what is a realistic objective. Feelings and emotions are hard enough to “measure” in individuals, much less the attitudes of an entire nation.

It is notable that in the three case studies of punitive strikes presented, there was a great deal of value given to the destruction or capture of *one individual*. This may be an example of measuring the wrong thing, three different times. The rhetoric following the raid on Libya revolved around whether or not Quaddafi himself had been a target; The nation’s natural impulse after the Columbus raid was the death of Poncho Villa; the British in Somaliland were determined to destroy the Mad Mullah. It would seem that given a situation where vengeance is the prime motivator our measures of effectiveness gravitate toward the elimination of *individuals* (or symptoms) as opposed to foundational causes, groups, networks or other enablers. In all of these cases, it is unclear whether that was the right approach. In these examples, although not always the stated objective, the death of the primary individual was a desired outcome, and it was believed—at least tacitly—that it would solve the problem.

Today we find ourselves in a situation where there is at least some measure of confusion over whether the war on terrorism is about finding and bringing to justice single individuals, or focusing more holistically on measuring success through other less discernible variables. The classic mistake is to narrowly focus on the belief that the death of a leader or one individual will have a direct causal relationship to the elimination or deterrence of the threat. In many cases, the delay between action and reaction may be so great that it would be difficult to attribute a reaction to a particular cause. The assertion by Prunckun- backed by statistical analysis- that air strikes on Libya reduced terrorist activities against United States citizens and interests is certainly believable. It does not, however, explain the terrorist attacks that have continued since the completion of his research in 1994. Libya is a nation that is enjoying an increasingly positive relationship with the West, moving farther and farther away from the rogue activities that aggravated its global relationships for years. Can we attribute this change of heart to El Dorado Canyon? Can it be attributed to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as

has been suggested by some political leaders?<sup>122</sup> Cause and effect are almost impossible to determine conclusively, even in the most simple of examples. They only become *more indeterminate* in a complex and changing system. The death or capture of a small group or individual may very well “settle the score” in the minds of the American public, but it should not overwhelm actions that focus on less emphatic objectives.

**Primitive, loosely structured actors or organizations may only respond to actual force, not the threat or potential use of force.** This may be one of the more important observations concerning punitive operations given our current and future enemies. Operations that seek to punish also have as a byproduct, deterrence. Deterrence is largely a function of perceptions about consequences. The Romans astutely “realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical, but psychological--the product of others' perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this strength”<sup>123</sup> and used the threat of force to achieve objectives. Nevertheless, threat alone may not be enough, especially with unstructured, primitive or fanatic entities. The Romans also understood that a less sophisticated enemy, absent the capacity to *perceive* potential threat, *may only respond to the actual physical expenditure of force*. Just as the Romans found it necessary to carry out persuasion or dissuasion by force of arms, we too may need to understand the dynamics of armed suasion.<sup>124</sup> Strategic planners should take care not to believe that every foe will have the reasoning capacity to perceive force and be deterred. Some enemies will only understand, and may even expect, the physical use of force.

Humans have engaged in war and violence for revenge and retribution for as long as they have been equipped to combat one another. Revenge is innate, vengeance is an eternal characteristic, and will not be marginalized by time or technology. Military leaders at all levels must understand that these emotions can shape every operation, and should not discount their effects on the conduct of expeditions or attacks. In a world where modern governments face enemies with fluid organizations,

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<sup>122</sup> Remarks by President George W. Bush in the James S. Brady Briefing Room, [December 19, 2003] in a Press Release by the Office of the Press Secretary, *Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs*, Washington, D.C.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

who lack the traditional frontages and instruments for dialogue and reconciliation, punitive actions that persuade or deter are significant. The belief that our enemies will always be encapsulated by reason, that they will respond to sophisticated concepts such as perception or deterrence, *may prove false*. As the Romans discovered through their own history, we to may need to invoke the power of our armed forces for no other reason than to persuade, dissuade or punish.

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<sup>124</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, 33.

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